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Consideration of the governments’ budgetary activity in the light of rent-seeking theory has been 
very limited and rent-seeking waste generated within the governments’ budget remained empty of 
empirical content. Katz and Rosenberg (1989) were the first authors to propose and apply a measure 
of rent-seeking, based on changes in government budgetary allocations. This thesis, alter analyzing 
the budget structure and the budgeting system in general and then in the Turkish framework, 
suggests a model to measure rent-seeking in government budgetary allocations. The measure is 
based on the supposition that every deviation in the expenditure part of the budget occurs as a 
result of rent-seeking activity and is indicative of a waste of resources.
Keywords: Budget Structure, Budgeting System, Rent-Seeking, Turkey.
ÖZET
BÜTÇELEME VE HÜKÜMETLERİN BÜTÇE AYARLAMALARINDAKİ
RANT ELDE ETME ARAYIŞI
AZIZ İBRAHİM SAĞLAM 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, iktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Y. Doç. Dr. Izak Atiyas 
Eylül 1996
Hükümetlerin bütçeleme aktivitelerinin rant elde etme teorisi ışığı altında ele alınması oldukça 
sınırlı bir düzeyde kalmıştır ve hükümetlerin bütçelerinde rant elde etme çalışmalarının oluşturduğu 
israf ve kayıp deneysel içerikten uzaktır. Katz ve Rosenberg (1989) hükümetin bütçe ödeneklerindeki 
değişikleri baz alan bir rant elde etme arayışı ölçüsünü sunan ve uygulayan ilk yazarlardir. Bu 
tez, bütçe yapısının ve bütçeleme sisteminin önce genel olarak ve daha sonra Türkiye koşullarında 
analizinden sonra, hükümetin bütçe ödeneklerindeki rant elde etme arayışını ölçmeye yarayan bir 
model önermektedir. Ölçü, bütçenin harcama kısmındaki her değişikliğin rant elde etme arayışı 
çalışmalarının bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıktığı ve kaynakların israfını gösterdiği varsayımına dayan­
maktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Bütçe Yapısı, Bütçeleme Sistemi, Rant Elde Etme arayışı, Türkiye.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been dissatisfaction with the budgetary system nearly in every country. It is widely 
believed that total government expenditures have been growing rapidly. Budget preparation and 
execution procedures have been criticized as ineffective both in restraining expenditure growth and 
in ensuring the best composition of the total. Moreover, there have been large differences between 
the planned amount of expenditures and the actual amount of expenditures. This fact is the start­
ing point of this study, by which a suitable measure for rent-seeking activity in the changes of the 
government budgetary allocations is tried to find.
The basic problem in this study is that rent-seeking is not directly observable. Therefore an as­
sumption is made on which the measure for rent-seeking is based. It is suppo.sed that every change 
in the expenditure part of the government’s budget occurs as a result of rent-seeking activity and 
is indicative of a waste of resources. For the purposes of measurement, the changes in programmed 
and actual amounts of expenditures in the budget are considered to represent rent-seeking.
Many examples of the rent-seeking effects of government intervention have been considered in 
the literature. However, the common point of all these examples is their focus on the government’s 
microeconomic policy and regulation. Consideration of the government’s budgetary activity in the 
light of rent-seeking theory has been very limited. Katz and Rosenberg (1989) have proposed and 
applied a measure of rent-seeking, based on changes in government budgetary allocations. In this 
thesis, the model of Katz and Rosenberg is modified for the Turkish case and a more accurate way 
for measuring the social waste is introduced.
Rent-seeking in government budgetary allocations is highly related with the corruption in the 
society, and thus in the political system. In a corrupt political system, policies are selected and 
implemented solely with a view of generating income for politicians and political support. At the 
end of this study it will be observed how the rent-seeking behavior and corruption in the system 
affect government expenditures especially in election years.
This study proceeds as follows. In the first two parts, budget structure and budgeting process 
are examined in a general framework and then in the framework of the Turkish system. Budget 
preparation, execution, and auditing as well as proposals for reform are discussed. Part 3 is devoted 
to the examination of the political aspects of budget process. The bargaining process is analyzed in 
three stages; bargaining in government, bargaining in parliament, and bargaining during execution 
of budget. Also, the effects of elections on the size of the expenditures are discussed in this part. 
Part 4 begins with a review of the main characteristics of the corruption and rent-seeking in general. 
Afterwards, the model of Katz and Rosenberg, and the proposed model for the Turkish case are 
introduced. Finally, the results are given and interpreted.
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PART 1 A  General View of Budget Structure and Budgeting Process
1 Nature of Budget and Budgeting
1.1 Definition of Budget Characteristics
A budget, in the most literal sense, is a document, containing words and figures, which proposes 
expenditures for certain items and purposes. The words describe items of expenditures, receipts, 
and purposes with the figures attached to each item or purpose. Presumably, those who make a 
budget, intend that there will be a direct connection between what is written in it and future events. 
Hence we might conceive of a budget as an intended behavior, as a prediction. If the requests 
for funds are granted and spent in accordance with instructions, and if the actions involved lead to 
the desired consequences, then the purposes stated in the document will be achieved. The budget 
thus becomes a link between financial resources and human behavior to accomplish policy objectives.
In the most general definition, budgeting is concerned with the translation of financial resources 
into human purposes. A budget, therefore, may be characterized as a series o f  goals with money 
figures attached. Since funds are limited and have to be divided in one way or another, the budget 
becomes a mechanism for making choices among alternative expenditures. When the choices are 
coordinated to achieve the desired goals, a budget may be called a plan. If emphasis is placed 
on achieving the best returns for a given sum of money, or on obtaining the desired objectives at 
the lowest cost, a budget may become an instrum ent for ensuring efficiency. Yet there may 
be a wide gap between the intentions of those who make up a budget and their real accomplishments.
Viewed in another light, a budget may be regarded as a contract. The legislative and executive 
branches promise to supply funds under specified conditions, and the agencies agree to spend them 
in ways that have been agreed upon. Whether or not the contract is enforceable, or whether or not 
the parties actually agree about the contents in the contract, is a matter for inquiry. To the extent 
that a budget is carried out, however, it imposes a set of mutual obligations and controls upon the 
contracting parties.
The government agencies submit to the Directorate of Budget their expectations. The.se arc the 
amounts they hope to receive and spend for various programs, so that they can generate the neces­
sary political support. Since the amounts requested often have an effect on the amounts received, 
however, budget proposals are often strategies. As each participant acts on the budget, he receives 
information on the preferences of others and communicates his own desires through the choices he 
makes. Here the budget emerges as a network o f com m unication in which iiilormation is coiitiii-
uously being generated and fed back to the participants.
The budget may be designed to coordinate diverse activities so that they support each other in the 
achievement of common goals; or it may be prepared primarily to discipline the governmental agen­
cies or to get the support of the clientele groups who benefit by the services that the agency provides.
The size and shape of the budget is a matter of serious contention in the political life. Minis­
ters, parliamenters, political parties, administrators, interest groups, and interested citizens compete 
with one another to have their preferences recorded in the budget. Thus, agreements, conflicts, and 
bargainings in a society all appear in the budget.
1.2 Budgeting and Objectives of the State
Adam Smith, whose insights into economic development and public finance make his work extremely 
relevant to current issues, identified three duties of the state: National defense, the administration 
of justice, and
...erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those piiblic works, which, 
though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, 
of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small 
number of individuals, and that it cannot be expected that any individual or small number 
of individuals should erect or maintain”^
Smith’s characterization of the state’s duties covers many, though not all, of the activities of gov­
ernments. The economic objectives of the state also include promotion of growth and development, 
stability, and equitable distribution of income and wealth. The objectives are subject to interpreta­
tion and become meaningful only when given specific content and reflected in policies.^ Objectives 
and policies are determined by policymakers, whose identity varies among countries depending on 
the political system and the influence of social, economic, and historical conditions. Policymakers 
include political leaders in the executive and legislative branches, senior civil servants, and in some 
countries military leaders. They may be more or less responsive to the wishes of the population, 
but only rarely are they guided solely by citizens’ preferences and desires. It may be assumed that 
political leaders are motivated not only by the national objectives of the state but also by their desire 
to remain in power and that most of the other policymakers are concerned also with maintaining 
and strengthening their agencies and their own positions.
^Adarn Sm ith (177G), ” An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealtli of Nations” , p. 681.
^Easton (1959) regards the determination of national objectives as an aspect of the authoritative allocation of the resources and as 
th<i basic function of the political system.
2 Budget Structure
2.1 Purposes of Budgeting
Budgeting serves several purposes.^ First, it sets a framework for policy formation. This requires 
decisions about actions to be taken to reach objectives. Choices must be made about which of 
many competing proposals should be adopted for particular national objectives. Second, budgeting 
is a means of policy implementation and a guide for management, and at the same time budgetary 
procedures are instruments of administrative control. Third, the budget is a means of legal control. 
Typically, budget decisions are embodied in laws or decrees, and the process of budget formula­
tion and execution is subject to constitutional provisions, laws, and regulations. At each stage, 
the question can be raised whether actions have been taken or omitted in conformity with legal re­
quirements. Fourth, the budget document may be a source of public information on past activities, 
current decisions, and future prospects. More broadly, the budget process can require the executive 
and legislative branches of a government to explain and justify their decisions and actions. This 
form of political accountability is very important in democratic systems.
2.1.1 Possible Conflicts Between the Purposes
The multiplicity of purposes complicates budgeting, since the requirements of the different functions 
sometimes conflict and a variety of information is needed to serve them. Efforts to support a ma­
jor new program may divert attention from proposals for improving public administration. Legal 
controls may take the form of detailed specifications and inefficient procedures, both of which may 
prevent management flexibility and decrease general efficiency. The kind of records that best serve 
the functions of legal accountability may not provide the information needed for policy formulation 
and effectiveness. As all the purposes are valuable, conflicts should be solved by consensus rather 
than by concentration on any one budgetary function.
2.2 Budget Principles
While preparing, executing, and auditing the budget, there are some principles that should be cared 
to. The realization of the objectives in the budget highly depends on the conformity to these prin­
ciples.
^Scc O zer (198G) for an explanation of the political, economic, social, and judici£il ¡)urposes and effects of the budgets.
2.2.1 Comprehensiveness Principle
This principle requires that all governmental agencies should be covered by the budget and that 
all financial transactions should be included. If the budget is not comprehensive, there can be no 
insurance that scarce resources are allocated to the areas which are most urgent among relevant 
alternatives.
The principle of budget comprehensiveness is often violated. First, certain kinds of transactions 
are omitted. Some expenditures financed by foreign aid or loans, and also some military expenditures 
may not be shown in the budget. Second, certain agencies that appear to perform governmental 
functions and that are financed by taxes may not be included in the budget. Social security systems 
are a leading example. Third, the establishment of separate capital and current budgets may conflict 
with the principle of comprehensiveness if the two budgets are not well coordinated.
2.2.2 Unity Principle
All of the receipts and expenditures of the state should be collected in only one budget. Such a 
unique budget will make it possible to see, examine, and control all the items in an easy way. Today, 
due to its function as planning and programming the economy, the states prepare different types of 
budgets like investment budgets, which lead to deviations in the unity princii)le.
2.2.3 Generality Principle
This principle requires all the receipts and expenditures to be shown in the budget separately, in the 
gross method of composition. Expenditures which may arise while collecting some budget receipts 
are shown separately in the expenditure part of the budget; similarly, if a public expenditure creates 
an income, this income is shown in the revenue part of the budget separately.
Since all the receipts and expenditures are shown in the budget separately, this makes it possi­
ble to get the relevant information easier and to metke comparisons. Moreover, it helps realizing a 
balanced budget, and making economic plans and programmes, and reducing waste and misuse of 
resources.
2.2.4 Appropriation Principle
For all the public services, there should be .some appropriation in the budget. An expenditure with­
out an appropriation and an expenditure above the predetermined appropriation is not possible. 
I'be appropriations can be u.sed only for those purposes, which are stated in the budget. If an
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appropriation is not used within a year, it is cancelled and cannot be used in the following years.
Other budget principles can be stated as truthfulness principle, openness principle, annuality 
principle, legislation principle, and approvement principle.“'
2.3 Types of Expenditures L· Receipts in the Budget
Government expenditures include: (1) purchases of goods and services, (2) transfer payments, and 
(3) lending. °
Purchase.s of goods and services are for carrying out government activities by the direct utilization 
of economic resources. The employment of civil servants and construction of public works are major 
items in this category. Transfer payments and lending are for providing enterprises and households 
purchasing power to i>iiy goods and services in the market. Transfer payments have become a large 
element in the budgets of developed countries, but in most developing countries they are relatively 
small.
Government receipts include; (1) taxes, (2) fees and income from state property and enterprises, 
(3) proceeds of the sale of land and other capital assets, (4) grants from other governments and 
international institutions, (5) borrowing, and (6) money creation.
Taxes are compulsory contributions and they are intended to force the household or enterprise 
to give purchasing power to the government. Taxes reduce the disposable income and wealth of 
those who bear them. Government borrowing involves the transfer of purchasing power from resi­
dent households and enterprises, from nonresidents, or from other governments, in exchange for a 
promise to repay, usually with interest. Money creation in the past took the form of the issue of 
fiat money by the state, that is, paper money or coins with nominal value in excess of their com­
modity value. Its modern form is borrowing from the central bank. Money creation has important 
consequences for the domestic economy, foreign trade and the balance of payments. The size of the 
fees and income from state property and enterprises is quite big in many countries, while proceeds 
of the sale of property generally are in very small amounts. Most developing countries receive some 
grants from abroad; in the majority of cases they are small, but in a few countries they make up a 
large fraction of total receipts.
There docs not exist a general agreement on the budget principles between the authors. DiiTerent classification and explanation of 
these principles can be found in Co.<;)kun (1978), Erginay (1975), and Feyzioglu (1972).
M'or a more elaborate classification of both expenditures and receipts, see IM F (1974).
2.4 Classification of the Budget
No one classification of expenditures and receipts can serve equally well the different purposes of the 
budget.® The agency classification of the expenditures facilitates legal control and accountability. 
This purpose is strengthened by adding an ob ject classification, which shows purchases of goods 
and services. If desired, an object classification can be subdivided into finely detailed categories.
However, agency and object classifications tell little about what the government is doing. For that 
purpose a functional classification of expenditures is more meaningful. It shows expenditures for 
purposes such as defense, education, health, and transportation.
A fourth classification, intended to facilitate economic analysis, shows the economic character of 
outlays. This econom ic classification distinguishes between current and capital items and be­
tween purchases of goods & services and transfer payments.
Functional and economic character classifications of expenditures are illustrated in Table 1.1. 
These two classifications are often combined. For example, a cross-classification by function and 
economic character may be made.
Usually the budget tables show receipts from each tax and give some information on nontax 
revenues. An illustrative classification of revenues appears in Table 1.2. Headings and subheadings 
would be added or deleted to reflect the revenue structure of the country.
'^On cliirercnt typos of classifications and their use, see Burklioad (195G).
Functional Classification
General public services
Defense
Education
Health
Social security and welfare 
Economic services 
Agriculture 
Mining
Manufacturing 
Communications 
Other economic services 
Unallocable and other purposes 
Interest on the public debt 
Other unallocable
Total expenditures
T able 1 .1 . T w o C lassifications o f G overnm ent E xp en d itu res
Economic Classification
Current expenditures
Expenditures on goods and services
Wages and salaries and related items 
Other purchases of goods and services 
Interest payments
Subsidies and other current transfers 
To public enterprises 
To households 
Transfers abroad 
Capital expenditures
Acquisition of fixed capital assets 
Purchases of stocks (inventories)
Purchases of land and intangible assets 
Capital transfers
Net lending including net acquisition of equities 
Total expenditures and net lending
Source: IMT (1974)
Tax Revenue
Taxes on net income and profits
Corporate, company, or enterprise
Individuals
Other
Social security contributions
Employer’s payroll or manpower taxes
Taxes on property
Domestic taxes on goods and services
General sales, turnover, or value-added taxes
Selective excises
Profits of fiscal monopolies
License taxes
Other
Taxes on international trade and transactions 
Import duties 
Export duties 
Exchange taxes and profits 
Other
Miscellaneous taxes 
Poll taxes 
Stamp taxes 
Other
T able 1 .2 . A  C lassification o f  G overnm ent R evenues
Nontax revenue
Income from public enterprises
Administrative fees
Fines and forfeits
Sales of government property
Other
Total revenues
Source: IMF (1974)
2.5 Current and Capital Budgets
A number of developing countries maintain separate current and capital budgets. An illustration of 
the current/capital division appears in Table 1.3. This is a rearrangement of items from Table 1.1. 
and Table 1.2., with the addition of the capital consumption allowance. The capital consumption 
allowance is an estimate of the loss of the value of physical capital assets due to wear and tear, and 
obsolescence.
Table 1.3. Current and Capital Budgets
Current (operations) budget
Revenues
Taxes
Fees and fines
Income from public enterprises
Expenditures
Current purchases of goods and services 
Interest payments 
Subsidies and transfer payments 
To public enterprises 
Other
Capital consumption allowance
Revenues - Expenditures = Net current surplus or deficit
=  Net saving or dissaving
Receipts
Capital (investment) budget 
Expenditures
From current budget Physical investment (new construction
Capital consumption allowance and equipment)
Net current surplus (deficit) Purchase of existing assets 
Sales of government property Net lending (including net acquisition of equities)
Sales of government property 
Net borrowing 
Grants received from abroad
Receipts - Expenditures = Change in cash balances
Source; IlicLs (1965)
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2.5.1 Purposes of Current/Capital Separation
The purpose of a separate capital budget is not always clear. Two possible purposes may be identi­
fied as follows;^
First, the capital budget provides a measure of asset accumulation through net or gross saving. 
By analogy with enterprise and household accounting, saving is often considered highly important. 
For enterprises, it measures retained profits; for households, it measures additions to wealth. The 
figure for government saving is important because it enters into various growth models and because 
of the attention it receives from many foreign observers. Second, a separate capital budget and a 
capital consumption allowance in the current budget can give a truer measure of the annual cost of 
government programs than a unified budget can in certain circumstances.
2.5.2 Problems of Current/Capital Separation
Apart from possible wrong inferences concerning macroeconomic management, problems arise when 
the current and capital budgets are not well coordinated. Generally, the capital budget is prepared 
by the planning organization and the current budget by the budget office, with little consulta­
tion between the two agencies and no systematic study of the demands that will be placed on the 
current budget over time for operating and maintenance expenditures as a consequence of capital 
expenditures. In these circumstances, rational decision-making becomes very difficult.® In a report 
examining the effects of a separate capital budget, it is stated that introducing a separate capital 
budget
” is quite likely to disrupt the existing budget process. A dual budget would require 
some changes in institutional structure, shifts in responsibility, and modifications of the 
budget cycle’s timing. The need to relate aggregate debt, tax, and spending limits to two 
separate budgets - capital and operating - would introduce greater complexity into the already 
complicated budget process.”^
On balance, there appears to be no real need to introduce a separate capital budget where none 
exists, and there are some risks in doing so. But neither is there a necessity for eliminating the cur- 
rent/capital distinction where it is well established and thought to be helpful. What is essential is 
recognition of the continuing effects of capital expenditures on future needs for current expenditures.
^Hicks (1905).
®Moreover, the distinction between capital expenses and current expenses is not clear-cut. For exainphi, education can be considered 
both as a current expense that is payable immediately, and as an investment in humcin capital.
^Report to the Committee on Environment and Public Works (1983).
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3 Budgeting Process
3.1 Steps in Budget Calendar
In well-stafFed administrations budgets may be formulated over many months, but in developing 
countries the process is likely to occur within a period of a few weeks. The timing should be set out 
in a budget calendar. A somewhat idealized version of the process involves the following ten steps:
1. A policy paper is prepared by the budget office for the consideration of the cabinet or the 
president. If the country has an economic plan, the paper is drafted in consultation with the plan­
ning department or jointly with it. The paper includes projections of revenues k  e.xpenditures and 
outlines major alternative proposcils for change during the coming year.
2. The cabinet or the president makes provisional decisions on the total amount of expenditures, 
on major new spending projects or cutbacks, and on major tax changes.
3. The budget office issues guidelines for the spending departments to follow in making their 
requests.
4. The budget office and the representatives of the spending departments discuss requests and 
attempt to reach agreement on them.
5. The budget office presents recommendations to the minister of finance, who places them before 
the cabinet after reviewing them; in a presidential system, the budget office presents its recommen­
dations to the chief executive.
6. Decisions on expenditures and any necessary changes in taxation are made by the cabinet or 
the president.
7. Spending departments have an opportunity to require a reconsideration if they think that their 
allocations are inadequate.
8. Final decisions are made by the cabinet or the president.
9. The budget proposals are submitted to the legislature.
10. The legislature considers and approves the budget. Its freedom to make changes in the ex­
penditure pro[)osals differs considerably among countries.
very cxt<îiısiv<î an.'ilysis of budget i)re|)aration for li) OIbCD countries is provided in O ztok and Çağlayan (1988).
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An incrementalist approach to reviewing expenditure requests is the most realistic one.‘ ‘ It starts 
with the assumption that the existing tax system and expenditure programs are to be continued 
with marginal changes. Attention is focused on relatively small increments, positive or negative. 
This makes the process for more comprehensible than it would be if all existing revenue sources 
and expenditure programs were throughly reexamined each year; it maintains continuity, and it 
avoids unproductive conflicts. However, incremental budgeting has some disadvantages; taxes and 
expenditure programs may be continued that would not be approved if all current options were 
systematically considered. Some proposed reforms intended to improve budget decision-making will 
be discussed in Section 4 of Part 1.
Spending departments tend to press for larger expenditures while the budget office urges re­
straint. They inflate their requests in order to leave room for cutbacks. This tactic is particularly 
used where the budget office follows the practice of reducing all requests, regardless of how well they 
are supported. Another tactic sometimes adopted by spending departments when they are asked 
to propose economies is to suggest the elimination of an especially popular and important item (an 
item, budget of which the budget office may not cut because of the public pressure) in order to 
divert attention from less popular items (items, budgets of which may be cut much more easily). 
The political aspects of budgeting will be analyzed in a great detail in Part 3.
3.2 Budgeting and Planning
Budgeting is a form of planning. But development or economic planning is a still broader process. It 
involves projections of population and indications of how labor, capital, natural resources, and inno­
vations can be combined to produce output. The processes of formulating the annual plan, evolving 
the budget, and ensuring a substantial degree of conformity between these and the medium-term 
development plan, e.g. 5 year development plan, are closely interlinked with the structure of the 
planning agency and the finance agency.
Budgeting without the elements of planning, and plans without a realistic recognition of the 
budgetary constraints would have little functional value. The proper coordination of budgeting and 
planning remains important. Care needs to be exercised in translating the multiyear plan into the 
annual budgets. The nature of the link between the plan and the budget is a test of whether a 
government is serious about its plan and intends to carry it out.^ ·^  Problems often arise becau.se of 
poor communication and cooperation between the planning and budgeting staffs.
¡ncrcmciitalism, see Linclblom (1958), and W ildavsky (1975). 
^^Watcrstoii (19G5).
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Planning and budgeting organizations should essentially be complementary. In practice, how­
ever, there are a number of areas where conflicts a r is e .T h e  conflicts stem from a wide variety of 
factors. But the main reason is that the planner is often considered as a big spender who would 
be prepared to spend any amount to achieve the needed rates of growth. The budgeter is, on the 
other hand, considered as one who would be more inclined to reduce expenditures.
Coordination between planning and budgeting is essential to the effectiveness of both. One ap­
proach is to place both functions in one ministry, usually the ministry of finance. This may be the 
only practical solution in some cases, particularly in small countries that have few qualified officials.*"' 
In most cases, however, there are advantages in having separate organizations. Different kinds of 
expertise and possibly different approaches are needed for planning and budgeting. A moderate 
degree of competition between government departments can stimulate new ideas and their critical 
examination.
The budget office and the planning organization should consult each other fully about the eco­
nomic assumptions underlying the budget and should collaborate in the preparation of the policy 
paper that initiates the formulation of the budget. Responsibility for the preparation of both current 
and capital budget proposals should be assigned to the minister of finance or budget director, al­
though the chairman of the planning comission should be given the opportunity to express separate 
views.
Funds may be allotted quarterly to projects on the basis of the scheduled phases of work and 
actual accomplishments. While the budget estimates are proceeding through the legislature, depart­
ments should submit to the planning authority and to the budget office tlie planned program of 
expenditure and work to be accomplished in the first quarter for each of their projects. On the basis 
of this information the budget office will make the first quarterly allocations. Requests for subse­
quent allocations will be made in conjunction with a progress report on expenditure and physical 
accomplishments. The planning authority will examine the reports and note any deviations from 
work plans, trace the reasons, and advise on remedies. Meanwhile, the budget office may reduce 
allotments on the basis of the information given in the quarterly progress report on actual expendi­
ture and physical accomplishments.
Undesirable consequences of tliese conflicts include delays in budget preparation, budget fragmentation, and inoperative plans (Caidon 
and W ildavsky (1980).
Although merging of the planning and budgeting functions in one organization might occur as a solution, given that presently, planning 
and budgeting have a sepiuate existence, it seeiTis more fruitful to devote attention to the develo|>ment of coordinating devices between 
the two processes rather than to try to merge them.
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3.3 Budget Execution and Auditing
Budget execution is viewed here from the expenditure side. The revenue side is governed mainly by 
procedures that can better be considered in connection with tax administration. Budget execution 
has the legal purpose of ensuring that expenditures are consistent with the limits set out in the 
annual budget law and with the requirements of permanent financial legislation and regulations. It 
also has the managerial function of promoting efficiency and the m acroeconom ic function of 
avoiding or minimizing economic disturbances caused by departures from budget projections.
Budget execution is the use of spending authority granted by the budget law. It includes commit­
ments (that is, contracts or other applications for hiring personnel and other purchases of goods and 
.services), disbursements to liquidate the commitments, and recording and reporting. Accounting 
and auditing, though often considered as separate operations, are here regarded as the final stages 
of budget execution.
Countries differ greatly in the degree to which commitments are subject to control by the budget 
office or another a g e n cy .In  some countries, detailed control is exercised by requiring the spending 
departments to obtain explicit approval before using the budget authorization. Usually such prior 
approval does not involve a reexamination of the merits of the expenditure but only a verification 
that it has been authorized and proper procedures have been observed (The procedure is often called 
preaudit). Prior approval systems tend to be cumbersome but may be useful where financial disci­
pline is weak.
In many systems, the budget office apportions the annual authorization by time periods (months 
or quarters) and establishes limits on the amount that can be committed within each period. The 
purpose of apportionm ent (also called allotm ents) is to prevent spending departments from 
making commitments too rapidly, either because of poor management or in the expectation that a 
supplementary appropriation will be forthcoming if the authorized amount is exhausted before the 
end of the year.
Usually, some changes are made in the budget during the year to allow for reassessments of needs 
and resources in the light of current developments. One kind of change is the transfer of spending 
authority between programs and sometimes between agencies or departments. The degree of for­
mality involved in intradepartm ental transfers (sometimes called virem ents) depends on how 
detailed the provisions of the budget law are and how centralized the system is. If revenues fall short 
of expectations, the budget office may cancel some part of the authority of operating departments 
to make commitments. The apportionment system makes this feasible. If increases in total expendi­
tures are to be made, supplementary action by the legislature usually will be required in countries,
’ ■''For the rules and procedures of budget e.xecution and auditing in 19 OECD countries, see O/.tok and Çağlayan (1988).
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in which the original budget was subject to legislative approval. Frequently supplementary appro­
priations are examined less carefully than the initial budget proposals and hence are a channel lor 
excessive expenditures.
A uditing is the review of transactions after their completion (This is sometimes called postau­
dit , as distinguished from preaudit). Auditing should be carried out by an independent agency not 
directly involved in the accounting function. This condition is clearly a desirable safeguard against 
conflict of interest.
The traditional approach, which may be called financial auditing, is intended to check compli­
ance with the budget law and other legal requirements. Reports drawing attention to any irregular­
ities are placed before the legislature or a committee of the legislature. The primary purpose is to 
prevent the recurrence of such irregularities. Sometimes, auditing activities are extended to include 
operations or |)erfonnance audits - also called com prehensive audits - that comment on the effec­
tiveness and efficiency of programs. In the majority of developing countries, however, auditing has 
not gone beyond the financial stage.
Auditing is often weak or nonexisting in countries without strong legislatures, and it can be effec­
tive only if the legislature or the executive pays attention to reports and follows up with corrective 
action.
4 Proposals for Reform
There has been dissatisfaction with the budget process nearly in every country. It is widely believed 
that total government expenditures have been growing to rapidly. Budget procedures have been 
criticized as outmoded and ineffective both in restraining expenditure growth and in ensuring the 
best composition of the total.
Many recommendations for reform have been advanced. Although the suggested reforms differ 
considerably in scope and terminology, the most widely discussed proposals to substitute a new 
system for conventional budgeting may be classified in four groups.'*^
^^Sec H arlow  (1973), Novick (19G5), UN (19G5) for performance budgeting and program budgeting; W ildavsky (1975), Hain- 
niond and K n ott (1979) for zero-base-budgeting; and Caiden and W ildavsky (1980) for continuous budgeting. See also Cojjkun 
(1972) and K ara (1982) for the appliciition of program budgeting in Turkey.
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In the performance budgeting, the emphasis in budgeting is changed from inputs, which are measured 
as money expenditures for specified objects, to outputs, which are measured in physical terms where 
feasible. In the countries where this type of budgeting is used, despite difficulties, some progress 
was made in classification and measurement, but budget decisions did not appear to be much affected.
4.1 Performance Budgeting
4.2 Program Budgeting
The family of proposals, incorporating some of the features of performance budgeting and going 
further, is called program budgeting. Elements found in the program budgeting include (1) empha­
sis on programs to attain objectives, (2) comparison of a wide range of alternative programs, (3) 
long-range or medium term projections, (4) measurement of performance, and (5) supplcrnentciry 
reporting on performance.
Difficulties were encountered in applying program budgeting, and experience with it has been 
disappointing. It proved to be hard to define programs and relate them to national objectives. One 
reason is that an activity often serves several purposes and is viewed differently by officials and inter­
est groups. There may be no way of directly relating budget expenditures to programs and spending 
departments. The measurement of output is fairly straightforward in some activities but virtually 
impossible for traditional functions such as law enforcement, foreign affairs, and national defense. 
Furthermore, consideration of a wide range of alternative ways to attain the specified purposes is 
impractical in most cases. The techniques could be used only to compare ways of carrying on a 
particular program and not for the more fundamental choice between programs. There is no formal 
analysis that can objectively compare the benefits of, say, defense and education.
4.3 Zero-base-budgeting
In the zero-base-budgeting (ZBB), the existing level of expenditures should not be taken for granted, 
but should be critically examined. ZBB called for reevaluating every program and requiring that it 
be freshly justified - from a zero base - instead of concentrating on proposed increases or decreases 
in spending. However, it proved to be impractical to spend time and energy that would have been 
required for a full annual reconsideration of all activities. It could be useful to demand a review and 
fresh justification of many programs, but to do so at intervals of several years rather than trying to 
reexamine every program each year.
Nowhere does a true zero-base-biidgeting practice exist. Everywhere the ’’ zero" is ignored and the base gets larger. What is worse, 
by building the budget entirely from zero, the justification for expenditures is divorced from their coruiections to other activities and 
purposes. This does not make sense. (H am m ond and K nott (1979).)
An approach that differs radically from other proposals for reform is the suggestion of Caiden and 
W ildavsky (1980) that developing countries adopt continuous budgeting. These authors argue 
that, because developing countries are subject to such a high degree of uncertainty, annual bud­
gets cannot incorporate reliable predictions. Departments that wished additions to their authorized 
spending rates would be allowed to request them at any time during the year. The ministry of 
finance would evaluate the requests in the light of its current appraisal of available resources and 
competing demands and would then approve the increase or impose cuts. A problem with the con­
tinuous budgeting is that it would assign greater authority to the ministry of finance, and might 
well increase conflicts between the finance ministry and spending departments.
The proposals that have been briefly reviewed here were addressed to real ileficiencies, and efforts 
to put reforms into effect have produced some benefits. The best way of budget improvement seems 
to be not the introduction of a wholly new system but the incorporation of some new elements into 
a conventional framework.*®
4.4 Continuous budgeting
' “ See Atiya.s and Sayın (199C) for the eharaetcristies of a budget reform proposal in the political framework of Turkey.
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PART 2 Budget Structure and Budgeting System in Turkey
1 Budget Structure
1.1 Budgetary Institutions
The main organizations involved in central budgeting are the Ministry of Finance, the State Plan­
ning Organization, and the Undersecretariat of Treasury. Organizationally, the latter two offices are 
attached to the Prime Minister’s Office.
The Ministry of Finance; has principal responsibility for the preparation of the budget. The Min­
istry also exercises considerable influence during the implementation of the budget. It is composed 
of the General Directorate of Budget and Fiscal Control (GDBFC), which reviews, compiles, and 
submits the estimat(;s to Parliament, and after approval, releases funds to the spending agencies; 
the General Directorate of Revenues (GDR), which prepares the revenue side of the budget and 
administers tax collection and tax legislation; the General Directorate of Accounting (GDA), which 
is responsible for keeping the government accounts, recording budgetary transactions and financial 
operations, preparing monthly statements and reports, and submitting the final accounts to Parlia­
ment. A number of other general directorates and boards also exist under the Ministry of Finance 
such as the Research, Planning and Coordination Board.
The State Planning Organization (SPO) is an agency of the Prime Ministcu’s Office and also the 
secretariat of the High Planning Council. It makes assessments on the natural, social, economic and 
all other resources of the country, and assists the government in drawing up the economic and social 
policies and targets, both in the short and long term. Thus, it prepares 5 year development plans 
and its annual programmes. It also prepares the investment budget of the spending agencies in line 
with the annual programme on a project basis.
The Undersecretariat of Treasury establishes the policies related to the state’s domestic and for­
eign loans, short and long term debt management and also cash management. Its another function 
is the financial management and financial operations related to the general budget.
^^For a compact examination of the concepts in this part, sec Cansızlar and Erken (1993). See also Ö zer (198G) for a detailed 
analysis of the budget structure in Turkey.
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1.2 General and Annexed Budgets
The annual Budget Bill submitted to Parliament is composed of two budget books: general budget 
and annexed budgets, both of which are presented on a gross basis; however the Budget Act is voted 
on a consolidated basis by deducting the treasury aid to annexed budget agencies from the sum of 
the general and annexed budgets. The general, annexed, and consolidated budget figures for the 
last three years are given below.
Table 2.1. General, A nnexed, and Consolidated B udget Figures (Million T.L.)
1993 1994 1995
General 398,710,000 823,396,307 1,355,978,053
Annexed 59,491,192 107,916,881 145,606,767
Total 458,201,192 931,313,188 1,481,584,820
Treasury Aid (-) 57,491,192 104,916,881 139,606,767
Consolidated 400,710,000 826,396,307 1,341,978,053
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
1.2,1 General Budget
The general budget covers the expenditures of ministries and legislative, judicial and other executive 
bodies of the State which have no revenues on their own. Table 26 in the Appendix shows the general 
budget agencies in the budget with their code numbers.
The expenditure budget includes current expenditures, investment expenditures and transfer pay­
ments including contingency funds for unforeseen expenditures. The general budget also includes the 
transfers to annexed budgets, public economic enterprises, extrabudgetary funds, revolving funds, 
and financial transactions such as loans. Revenues are divided into three main categories as tax 
revenues, regular nontax revenues, and special revenues and funds. The revenue budget is estimated 
on the basis of collections made during the last fiscal year.
1.2.2 Annexed Budget
Annexed budget covers the expenditure and revenue budgets of each annexed budget agency which 
are autonomous and independent organizations, mainly universities and a number of general direc­
torates. Table 27 in the Appendix shows the annexed budget agencies in the budget with their code 
numbers. Although they have revenues of their own, with a few exception, more than 90 per cent of 
the revenues of annexed budgets are transfers from the general budget, while other revenues stem 
from fees, charges, noncommercial sales, and profits transferred from revolving funds. The transfers 
from the general budget to some annexed budget agencies in 1994 are shown in Table 2.2.
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99.00 1.00
93.10 6.90
98.60 1.40
98.10 1.90
99.00 1.00
99.90 0.10
100.00 0.00
99.50 0.50
Table 2.2. The Treasury A id to Som e A nnexed B udget A gencies 
A gen cy  Treasury A id Self Source
__________________________________________  (in % )__________ (in % )
General Directorate of Agricultural Reform 
General Directorate of Youth and Sport 
General Directorate of Highways 
General Directorate of State Water Works 
General Directorate of Village Services 
General Directorate of Petroleum Affairs 
Higher Education Council 
Universities 
Source: Ulugbay (1 i^ 95)
1.3 Classification of the Budget
The Turkish budget structure is based on four expenditure classifications.'fhe first is the orga­
nizational classification of general and annexed budget agencies which shows the appropriations 
authorized for each agency. The program m e classification includes programmes, subprogrammes, 
activities, and projects within each organization. The third is the econom ic classification, which 
describes the economic nature of expenditures and compromises three categories such as current 
expenditures (personnel, other current), capital expenditures, and transfers. Finally, expenditure 
classification contains expenditure items in terms of object and in nine groups which are coded 
from 100 to 900 and divided into subclassifications. The nine groups are classified as follows:
__________ Table 2.3. Classification o f E xpenditure Item s__________
C ode num ber E xpenditure Item s
100 Personnel Expenditures
200 Travel Expenses
300 Purchase of Services
400 Purchase of Consumption Materials and Supplies
500 Purchase of Furniture and Fixtures
600 Purchase of Machinery, Equipment and Vehicles
700 Construction and Repairernent Expenditures
800 Other Payments
900 Transfer Payments
.Source: Ulugbay (1995)
An example for the existing presentation of expenditures in the budget of an agency is given in 
d able 2.4.___________________________
^°Co!jkuii (1972) .incl K ara (1982).
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T a b le  2 .4 . T h e  P re s e n ta tio n  o f  th e  B u d g e t  E x p e n d itu re s  (M illion T .L .)
P ro g ra m S u b p ro g ra m A p p r o p r ia t io n P r o je c t E x p e n d itu re E X P L A N A T IO N E x p e n d itu r e P r o je c t A p p r o p r ia t io n S u b p r o g ra m P ro g r a m
C o d e C o d e K in d C o d e Item
111 1
1
TR EA SU R Y  GEN. ECON. POL.
31 ,398
31 ,925
207, 777
1
100
Treasury and Gen. Econ. Pol. 
Personnel Exp. 29,001
31,398
200 Travel Exp. 1,201
300 Purch. o f Serv. 797
2 400 Pure, o f Cons. M at. and Supp. 401
2 500 Pure, o f Furn. and Fixtures 1
527
1
600
Pure, o f Vehiele for the G O F E R  
Pure, o f Maeh., Equip, and Vehieles 527
527
Source: Ulugbay (1995)
2 Budgeting System
2.1 Preparation of Budget
The annual budget cycle begins with a ’’ Budget Call” issued by the Prime Minister. The Prime Min­
ister’s Budget Message offers a broad statement of principles for the forthcoming budget. Meanwhile, 
the Ministry of Finance issues a ’’ Guide for Budget Preparation” , which states a number of technical 
principles for tlie budget preparation, e.g. classification of programmes; classification of transfers; 
and certain unit-cost standards relating to current expenditures. On the basis of these instructions, 
the spending ministries and other agencies prepare their draft budget proposals. These draft bud­
gets are negotiated with the Ministry of Finance as far as current expenditures are concerned, while 
investment budget proposals are negotiated with the State Planning Organization (SPO).
The High Planning Council settles a friimework for the finalization of the draft budget. It decides 
economic and social targets, and specifies the maximum amount of current, investment and transfer 
allocation for the agencies. Within this framework. Ministry of Finance and SPO finalize the draft 
budget after negotiations with agencies. The revenue budget, which is prepared by the General 
Directorate of Revenues (GDR), is then included in the budget bill by the General Directorate of 
Budget and Fiscal Control (GDBFC). The draft Budget Bill and its documents, the Budget Mem­
orandum, and the Annual Economic Report are then submitted to the Parliament.
The Budget Bill is first considered by the Plan and Budget Committee of the Parliament. The 
members of this Committee can propose any amendment they wish to the Budget Bill. During the 
debates in this session, members of Parliament cannot propose amendments that would increase 
expenditures. Parliament debates the Budget Bill as amended by the Plan and Budget Commit­
tee; members of Parliament may express their opinions on the budgets of individual ministries cind 
agencies during this general debate. The various budget headings, and pro{)osals for amendments 
are then read out and put to the vote without separate debates. The final approval of Parliament 
on the Budget Bill takes place at programme level.
If Budget Bill is not passed by Parliament before the start of the fiscal year. Parliament may pass 
a provisional bill that authorizes government to spend up to a certain percentage of the amount 
appropriated by the budget of the previous year, until a new budget is passed by Parliament.
2.2 Execution of Budget
The execution of the state budget involves the following three stages that must be carried out to 
regulate the flow of funds and ensure expenditure control. These checks and l)alances are built into
2.·]
the system  by the General A ccounting  Law. 21
The first stage is the release o f  appropriations by the Ministry of Finance. The second is 
the allocation and suballotm ent o f  the released appropriations to the subordinate units of 
a government agency. The third stage is the utilization o f allocated appropriations by the 
spending department, through the finance and accounting offices of the Ministry of Finance. This 
stage includes four phases: Commitment, accrual, payment order, and payment instruction.
These phases are carried out by officials designated by the General Accounting Law: (1) A llo ­
cating officer, who is the head of a spending department and authorized to give written orders and 
permission to the government accountant for the payment of expenditures; (2) expenditure assess­
ment officer, who is staff member ot a spending department and is responsible for the commitment 
and accrual transactions of the expenditure process; (3) finance d irector, who is staff member of 
the Ministry of l'’inance - GDBFC - and carries out the budgetary accounting and financial reporting 
services; and (4) governm ent accountant, who is staff member of the Ministry of Finance - GDA - 
and is responsible for ensuring the accuracy and conformity of the expenditures with the authorized 
purposes, for issuing payment orders, making payments, and recording expenditures.
2.3 Completion of Budget Process
On annual basis, the fiscal year’s results are presented in the final budgetary accounts. The govern­
ment accountants prepare a number of reports reflecting the results of the budgetary transactions 
and related complementary information. These reports are submitted to the GDA and the Court of 
Accounts (CA) to be used as a basis for the final accounts.
Each of the ministries must submit the expenditure final accounts schedule to the Ministry of 
Finance and the CA. The Ministry of Finance must submit the Final Accounts Bill including the 
Treasury General Account Schedule to the CA and also to the Parliament. The CA reviews the 
statements of accountants, the ministries’ final expenditure schedules and the Treasury’s General 
Account, and then submits the general conformity statement to the Parliament. The budget cycle 
is then completed when the Final Accounts Bill is approved by the Parliament.
21 Büyüklü and Kaınilüğlu (1976).
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2.4 Auditing of Budget
2.4.1 Internal A uditing
Commitment, delivery of goods, and accrual and payment procedures of the budgetary transactions 
are examined by expenditure assessment officers and the finance director of the spending depart­
ment, and then by a government accountant of the respective accounting office.
The montfily statements and schedules of the government accountants are reviewed and the nec­
essary corrections are made and verified by the GDA. The monthly ’’ Public Accounts Bulletin” , 
prepared on the basis of these statements and schedules, is an important means of monitoring ex­
penditure and revenue collection.
The internal auditing also includes control and inspection carried out by the Ministry of Finance 
at three levels: (1) Financial inspectors control the transactions of the accounting offices of the gen­
eral and annexed budget agencies. State Economic Enterprises, revolving funds, and special funds;
(2) the GDA controllers inspect the transactions of government accountants throughout the country;
(3) also, the control offices of chief officers of finance examine transactions of government accoun­
tants. in addition to those in the Ministry of Finance, there are inspection units for internal control 
in certain ministries and annexed budget agencies.
2.4.2 External A uditing
External auditing of the budget is performed by the CA in the name of Parliament. The Court 
has both preauditing and postauditing functions. It exercises its preauditing function by giving its 
approval, ’’ visa” , for the payment orders submitted by the ministers, and for contracts in excess of 
certain amounts. As for postauditing, the accounts and transactions of all government accountants, 
assessment officers and chiefs of disbursement are audited by the CA through its auditors. Consti­
tutionally, this process is a judicial function performed on behalf of the Parliament.
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PART 3 Political Aspects of Budget Process
1 Bargaining in Budget Process
The politico-economic literature focuses on how the specific institutional arrangements, voting ar­
rangements, and commitment mechanism in the budgeting process affect the existence and the 
properties of the outcome.
According to W ildavsky (1975), the budget process is a mechanism through which politiccil 
interest groups ’’ bargain over conflicting goals, make side-pa ym ents, and try to m otivate one another  
to accomplish their objectives” .
Budgeting procedures, according to which budgets are drafted by the government, amended and 
passed by the parliament, and implemented by the government are very important for the degree 
of fiscal stability attained. Already, the pre.sent models^  ^ in the literature describe the budgeting 
process and the bargaining in this process in three stages.
1.1 Bargaining in Government
On the first stage, government prepares a budget draft to be presented before parliament. Conflicts 
of interest between the ministers are to be resolved in this drafting process.
Spending ministers are inherently biased to push for increased spending on their own ministries, 
since the resulting taxes or deficits to finance the extra expenditure fall on the general public, while 
the spending benefits their own constituency and raises their political support. Also, the political 
success of the spending ministers is usually measured in terms of the size of their budgets. In con­
trast, the prime minister and the finance minister are not bound by particular interests - or not to the 
same extent - and therefore, are more constrained by considerations of general public welfare than 
the spending ministers. The distribution of power between these two groups, therefore, becomes 
very important in determining the size of the expenditures in the budget.
^^voii H agen (1992) and von Hagen and Harden (1995).
^^von H agen and H arden (1995) distinguish two alternative approaches relating to the bargaining process in the government: I'lic 
target oriented approach , where the government collectively negotiates a set of targets for budget, and the p rocedu re oriented 
approach , where the budget process vests the prime minister and fin.incc minister with special strategic powers. The procedure oriented 
approach is adequate when the private gains from spending are relatively large, while multi-party coalition governments will find a target- 
oriented approach more adequate as it emphiLsizes collective decision making rather than dominance of one or a few leading cabinet 
ÎU embers.
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1.2 Bargaining in Parliament
On the second stage, the government’s budget proposal is submitted to parliament where it becomes 
subject to another bargaining process between government and the parties represented in parliament. 
Members of parliament represent local or other constituencies and are, therefore, characterized by 
a similar - if not stronger - spending bias as spending ministers. On the other hand, members of 
parliament are bound by party discipline. For the members of the party or the parties supporting 
the government, party discipline necessitates voting for the government, even if the outcome does 
not fully match the individual preferences of the members of parliament.
The most important dimension of the relationship between parliament and government is char­
acterized by the political implications of rejecting the budget which is proposed by the government. 
The strategic effect of the possibility to reject the budget proposal is two-fold. On the one hand, 
the more likely a rejection is, the more it is in government’s interest to propose a budget that can 
be expected to find a majority in parliament. This tends to weaken the position of government in 
the process. On the other hand, members of the parties supporting government will avoid from 
proposing changes to the budget proposal if doing so may cause to fall of the government. This 
second effect tends to strengthen government’s position in the process.
Voting procedures within parliament can be characterized by the order and scope of the votes. 
Parliament may debate and then vote on the entire budget in one step. Alternatively, it may discuss 
and vote on the budget item by item, followed by a general vote on the budget as a whole. Another 
alternative is that, parliament may first vote on the overall budget size and then debate and vote over 
the individual items, von Hagen (1992) conjectures that the latter approach is more conducive to 
fiscal discipline, while Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) state that, contrary to popular belief, the 
latter procedure does not always lead to a smaller budget than the others.
1.3 Bargaining During Execution of Budget
The third stage contains the execution of the budget under the control of government. During the 
execution new demands for spending occur in response to unforeseen economic events, as well as 
discrepancies between planned and actual revenues and expenditures. As in the drafting process, for 
their political interests, spending ministers, when compared to prime minister or the finance min­
ister, are more inclined to demand increased spending and to overrun the limits set by the budget 
law. Two conflicting forces become important; the degree to which the budget law binds the gov­
ernment’s actions during the fiscal year, and the degree of flexibility to respond to unforeseen events.
Olson (1965).
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The bargaining process in these three stages lead to define and test two propositions:
1. Structural H ypothesis: A budgeting process with strategic dominance of the prime or 
finance minister over the spending ministers, limiting the parliamentary amendment power, and 
limiting changes during the execution process is strongly conducive to fiscal discipline.
2. Long-term  Constraint H ypothesis: The more budgetary decisions are tied to a multi- 
period fiscal program, the greater the degree of fiscal stability achieved.
von Hagen (1992) finds strong empirical support for the structural hypothesis. This support 
can be interpreted as pointing to the importance of a commitment^® mechanism in the budgeting 
process. Spending ministers are exposed to political pressures from interest groups and, since taxes 
fall on the general public while expenditures benefit particular groups, are biased in their decisions 
towards large expenditures and large deficits. The prime minister and the finance minister, in con­
trast, do not dc[)end on particular interest groups to the same extent; their decisions are more 
strongly guided by general economic considerations. A strong position of the prime minister or the 
finance minister and limited parliamentary power enable the government to commit fiscal strategies 
which limit expenditures and deficits and to defend these strategies against the political pressures.
The role of long-term fiscal constraints in achieving fiscal discipline, while in most cases positive, 
is not found to be significant. While it may not be concluded from this that long-term constraints 
lack importance, the conclusion may be that a long-term constraint will only be effective if govern­
ments have an effective commitment mechanism in the budgetary process.
1.4 Problem of Asymmetric Information
Spending ministers, who specialize in the politics of their individual subjects and the management 
of their administrations, are likely to be better informed, when compared to other ministers in the 
government, about the public’s demand for the activities they deliver as well as their administrative 
technologies. This asymmetric information creates incentives to misrepresent targets and technolo­
gies to gain more funds in the budget process. This incentive could be eliminated by giving the prime 
minister the authority to dictate the budget appropriations for alt spending ministers. However, if 
the uncertainty on targets and technologies is large and the information asymmetry is sufficiently 
strong, this would put the government’s political decisions at the risk of making poorly informed 
choices. The spending ministers must be given some opportunity in order to make use of their
A commitment is a promise to perform in a specified fashion. A commitment is credible either because it is self-enforcing (m otivational 
cred ibility ) or becau.se it is impossible to act otherwise (im perative cred ibility ).
^®von Hagen (1992).
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superior information. With asymmetric information, budget negotiations now have the additional 
function of revealing information about policy targets and administrative technologies.
2 Budget Expenditures L· Elections
In nearly all countries, much larger spending amounts are observed in the election years when com­
pared to those in the nonelection years. When examined closely, it is observed that the notion that 
elections cause to spend more is not a single theory, but a family of ideas. Payne (1991) looks at 
two main variants of the theme, the ’’economic voter” and the ’’ image protection” theories.
2.1 The Economic-Voter Theory
Perhaps the most popular version of the spending-voting connection is what might be termed the 
’’economic-voter” th e o r y .In  this view, voters want government spending for themselves. In order 
to please these voters, and be elected and reelected by them, parliamcnters vote for the respective 
spending programs. ’’ Voters in general” may be opposed to this ’’ special interest” spending, but 
either they don’t know about it, or it is too small in the overall spending picture to interest them, 
so it does not influence their electoral behavior. Hence the parliamenter ensures his reelection by 
constantly voting for more and more spending. The classic illustration of this pattern is voting for 
farm subsidies. Only the farmers want these subsidies, and the rest of the voters don’t really care. 
So, according to the theory, it is always in the parties’ and government’s electoral interest to support 
subsidies.
2.1.1 W eaknesses o f  the T heory
Though persuasive at first glance, it turns out that the economic-voter theory has a number of 
weaknesses, which can be stated as follows:
1. Economic self-interest voting in elections would rarely be rational, even for members of spe­
cial interest groups: The economic-voter theory overlooks the fact that a single vote represents an 
infinitesimal fraction of the governmental decision-making process. The first thing the voter would 
notice is that the probability that his single vote would change the election is too small to tiike 
seriously. FuCrthermore, this voter would notice that even if his favored candidate won the election,
^^See M yerson  (1984a) for bargaining problems with incomplete information, and M yorsoii (1984b) for cooperative games with 
incomplete information.
28 See Downs (1957) for the first formal statement of economic self-interest voting.
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he would be only one of the hundreds of parliamenters and, hence, would have a correspondingly 
small chance of affecting the outcome of any given spending bill. Moreover, even if this parliamenter 
played the deciding role in the Parliament, there still is the Constitutional Court, the Presidency, 
and the bureaucracy. Any of these may veto, in one fashion or another, the spending desired by the 
voter. Thus, the connection between a single vote and a favorable spending outcome is a chain of 
probabilities so small that no thoughtful person would depend on it.
2. Voting on the basis of economic self-interest might well pressure legislators to vote against 
spending: The economic-voting theory assumes that voters would never have any significant reason 
to oppose spending programs. But of course they would. They are taxpayers, and could save thou­
sands of their own dollars if government spending were cut.
3. When voting, voters may not be solely - or strongly - guided by economic self-interest: The
economic-voting theory assumes that, voters make decision according to their financial self-interest. 
It is not clear that all voters approach the task in this frame of mind. Usually, political, ethnical, 
and religious factors become very important.
4. Voters generally <lo not have the level of information necessary to know how the parliamenters 
act in the Parliament: The voters are remarkably ignorant about even very simple features of the 
political world. The majority of voters cannot recall the names of the parliamenters of their city, 
they do not know which parties exist in the Parliament, and how their representative votes on dif­
ferent political issues. In other words, they are generally incapable of rewarding or punishing their 
representative for his action on spending bills.
5. The voting behavior of the voters is generally shaped by factors other than the political charac­
teristics of candidates: Voters choose one candidate mainly on the basis of three factors: party label, 
name recognition of the candidate, and the image of the candidate as honest, friendly, unselfish, and 
intelligent. Candidates win and lose elections mainly on the basis of advertising campaigns, not on 
the basis of their votes on political issues in Parliament. A candidate’s action on a spending measure 
would probably be, at best, only a minor factor in an election outcome.
2.2 The Image-Protection Theory
The foregoing review indicates that the economic-voter theory has a number of serious weaknesses. 
Many of the problems with this approach arise from its dependence on "economic-man” assumptions 
about voters, assumptions that are far from the reality of how voters behave. It seems that if these 
assumptions were relaxed, one could develop a somewhat more plausible theory.
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Such a theory stresses ’’ image protection” . The key axiom in this theory is that members of the 
Parliament want to protect their image, that is, the public’s perceptions about their basic virtues. 
Politicians want to appear kind, intelligent, honest, and hard-working; conversely, they do not want 
to appear cruel, stupid, dishonest, or lazy.
This focus on image is a realistic foundation for a theory about electoral processes because it 
takes into account voter behavior. As noted above, voters generally do not know about the legisla­
tive votes of the parliamenters; thus, they cannot respond to these votes. They can, however, form 
a rough impression about a candidate’s virtues. The image-protection theory of spending says that 
special interest groups influence a parliamenter or a minister by threatening to harm his image if he 
votes against their desired spending.
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PART 4 Rent Seeking in Government Budgetary Allocations
The negotiations of ministers, parliamenters, and officials are, in general, preoccupied with which 
policies to apply and is little concerned with how they can be carried out effectively and efficiently. 
Declarations, which are unsupported by action often appear in electoral speeches and stabilization 
programs. These declarations are either never carried out or they are partly realized, but at high 
cost. The reasons for these failures are too varied. Usually, people - including many political leaders 
and government officials - are strongly motivated with their own interests and the interests of ethni­
cal, regional, religious or other interest groups and often are little concerned with wider community 
or national interests. Some other important factors appear to be inadequate understanding of the 
difficulties, lack of needed information, inconsistencies of policies, corruption, and rent-seeking be­
havior. Here we will first examine in a general view corruption and rent-seeking behavior, and then 
we will try to measure the wa.ste due to the rent-seeking in government budgetary allocations.
1 Corruption and Rent-seeking in General
A very extensive definition of corruption provides that a person is guilty of corruption who
’’being or expecting to be a public servant, accepts, or obtains, or agrees to accept, or  
attem pts to obtain fr o m  any person, fo r  h im self or fo r  any other person, any gratification  
w hatsoever, other than legal paym ent, as a m otive or reward fo r  doing or forbearing to do 
any official act or fo r  showing or forbearing to show, fa vo r  or disfavor to any person or  
fo r  rendering o r  attem pting to render any service or disservice to any person.
The main reason of corruption is that certain persons have the power to perform or not perform 
acts that result in economic benefits or harm to individuals or enterprises. Corruption is fostered by 
administrative looseness and weakness, and by the existence of complex and nonfunctional tax and 
procurement systems, fiscal rules, and procedures that grant discretionary power (power to select 
between different alternatives) to ministers and officials.
In a corrupt political system, policies are selected and implemented solely with a view of gener­
ating income and political support. That course of action is chosen which maximizes the welfare of 
the politician, whether corruption is involved or not.
Although being a revisionist,™ Nye (1967) accepted the po.ssibility that corruption may direct 
resources into "soc ia lly  undesirable areas." In particular, capital " m a y  be channelled into sectors such
IntciTiiitional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
^°See footnote 31 for the revisionist approach.
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as construction not because o f  econom ic profitability, but because they are m ore susceptible to hide 
corrupt fe e s . Scot t  (1972) finds that patronage considerations are often reflected in the structure 
of development programs. Fieldhouse (1986) describes the influence of patronage considerations 
on the nature of goods and services provided. Only those from whom political support is expected, 
receive a share of the limited stock of benefits. ” It is better to offer selective benefits to sm all groups 
o f  big fa rm ers rather than to help all fa rm ers by paying higher prices fo r  their produce.'"
At the most general level, rent seeking is said to be the expenditure of resources for the purpose 
of obtaining some transfer. Several definitions of rent seeking have been put forth by various authors.
R ent seeking ¿.s meant to describe the resource-wasting activities o f  individuals seeking transfers 
o f  wealth through the aegis o f  the state.
The term  î-ent seeking describes behavior in institutional settings, where individual efforts to m ax­
im ize value, generate social waste rather than social surplus.^'^
Thus, attempts by individuals, firms, and groups to get the state to act in their interest are 
labelled ’’ rent seeking” . Medema (1991), who sets out some basic elements of an institutional ap­
proach for rent-seeking states that rents are ubiquitous, that is, rents are everywhere. This becomes 
very apparent if rent is defined as "in co m e received above the am ount that would be received under 
a different institutional arrangement."^'^ He also claims that rent seeking is ubiquitous: This follows 
logically from the first point. If rents are available through the alteration of legal arrangements, then 
some agents will devote resources toward securing a change in their favor, while others will devote 
resources toward the maintenance of the status quo in order to protect their rents.
The only way to avoid rent seeking is to prescribe an unalterable set of relations within society. 
Once we allow for the possibility and desirability of change in legal and economic relations, we in­
evitably introduce rent seeking. Mueller (1989) says that " t he  sim plest and best way to avoid the 
rent-seeking problem  is to avoid establishing the institutions that create rents, that is, the regulations 
and regulatory agencies that lead to rent seeking."
is generally accepted that corruption has a negative effect on the allocation of resources because resources are drawn into rent-seeking 
activities. However, rcvi.sioiiists have argued that corruption often leads to an efficient allocation of resources, or even to an improvement 
of allocative efficiency. See Bayloy (19GG), Loft' (19G4), and Nyo (19G7) for the revisionist view of corruption. K uror (1991) showed 
that the revisionists were wrong in their arguments.
Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock (1980).
Buchanan (1980).
Samuels and M orcuro (1984).
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2 Influence Costs Arising From Rent-Seeking Behavior
Two kinds of costs generally accompany increases in discretionary centralized authority. The first 
kind is the cost o f  inappropriate interventions, the reason of which is that individuals in author­
ity may have personal interests in decisions and may misuse their authority on their own initiative. 
These costs can be reduced or even eliminated by giving authority in honest, wise individuals and 
by giving them incentives to care only about organizational performance. However, discretionary 
authority results in a second kind of cost which is incurred even when the central authority is incor­
ruptible. These costs arise because others in the organization may attempt to persuade or manip­
ulate those with authority to use it excessively or inappropriately. These are called influence costs.
One reason intlucnce is unavoidable is that decision-makers must rely on others for information 
that is not easily available to them directly.^'’ Decision-makers rely extensively on other people in 
the organization for information, suggestions, and analyses to reach decisions. These people may 
have incentives to distort the information that they provide. But, even if the incentives to distort 
the information could be determined, the problem of knowing what information they actually have 
would still exist. Therefore, decision-makers generally rely on the information, although they know 
that it is incomplete or inaccurate.
3 Katz-Rosenberg Measure of Rent-seeking in Government Budgetary 
Allocations
Having defined and analyzed corruption and rent-seeking in general, now we can examine the rent- 
seeking behavior in government budgetary allocations.
Many examples of the rent seeking effects of government intervention have been considered in 
the literature.^*  ^ However, the common point of all these examples is their focus on government’s 
microeconomic policy and regulation. Consideration of the government’s budgetary activity in the 
light of rent-seeking theory has been very limited, and rent-seeking waste generated within the gov­
ernment’s budget remained empty of empirical content.
K atz and R osenberg (1989) were the first authors to propose and ap[)ly a measure of rent- 
seeking, based on changes in government budgetary allocations. Their study was an initial step
the section "1.4. T h e P roblem  o f A.syinmetric In form ation” at page 28 for the effects of infomiation asymmetry between 
the ministers on the bargaining process in the government.
^^The monopolies and import quotas are basic areas, which have often generated government intervention and created rents, for these 
examples and more, see Buchanan (1980), K n iogcr  (1974), Posnor (1975), and Tiillock (19G7).
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to theoretical and empirical studies in the area, which they called the ’  ^macroeconomic effects of 
rent-seeking” in the budgetary allocations.
Their measure of rent-seeking is based on the supposition that every change in the expenditure 
part of the government’s budget occurs as a result of rent seeking activity and is indicative of a 
waste of resources resulting from rent-seeking. For the purposes of measurement, this change in the 
budget is considered to represent rent seeking activity.
The first measure, lit, captures rent seeking for budgetary allocation as a proportion of overall 
government spending. This is defined as
where S{t)i, S{t — i), are the proportions of the budget going to purpose i in years t and t — 1 
respectively, the number n is equal to the number of categories in the budget, and the division by 2 
is done to avoid double counting, lit is, therefore, the sum of the absolute changes in the proportion 
allocated to different budgetary categories in year t over year t — 1.
'I'lie mean value of Rt over time for each country was calculated to yield
where c =  l,...,m  is a country index and 2’ is the number of years. Rt can then be viewed as 
representing the mean rent-seeking in country c for government budgetary allocation.
In Table 4.1., both Rc and the maximal value of lie S'l'c provided for given countries. The numbers 
in column 10072c measure the rent-seeking waste in cents, per each dollar spent by the government.
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Table 4.1. Rent-seeking in Relation to the Budget
Rank Country lOORo
(average rent-seeking 
as percentage of budget)
max (100 x Re) 
(maximum rent-seeking 
as percentage of budget)
1 France 1.28 2.68
2 FR Germany 1.38 3.55
3 Swiss 2.10 7.61
4 Belgium 2.13 4.88
5 UK 2.55 3.99
6 Sweden 2.59 4.74
7 Canada 2.61 3.73
8 USA 2.80 4.77
9 Australia 2.87 6.63
10 Spain 2.92 4.13
11 Kenya 3.97 6.77
12 Greece 5.28 8.04
13 Chile 5.32 14.34
14 Korea 6.08 16.24
15 Italy 7.31 25.17
16 Israel 7.58 14.63
17 Turkey 7.70 18.55
18 Indonesia 7.85 16.09
19 Mexico 10.16 30.96
20 Egypt 10.19 24.08
Source; Katz and Rosenberg (1989)
While Rc indicates the inefficiency in government spending, it may be of little consequence if the 
government sector is small. Therefore, a second measure of the waste is introduced as a percentage 
of GNP. This measure, namely Wc, indicates the social cost of rent-seeking for budgetary allocation. 
The calculation of this measure of waste is
X (
where Gc is the mean, over time of government expenditure and GNPc is the mean, over time of 
national income in country c.
In Table 4.2., both lOOkKc 'i^ nd rankings according to Wc and Rc arc provided. lOOlTc can be 
considered cis the measure of rent-seeking waste - as percentage of GNP - in cents per each dollar 
spent by the government. While there arc some changes in the ranking, there appears to be a general 
correlation between the Rc and Wc- It can be seen that developed economies s(;em to be less wastelul
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than less developed  countries, in which corruption  and rent-seeking behavior occu r m ore frequently.
Table 4.2. Rent-seeking as Percentage of GNP
Country lOOVUc
(waste as percentage of GNP)
Rank by Wc Rank by Rc
Switzerland 0.19 1 3
FR Germany 0.20 2 2
France 0.51 3 1
Canada 0.59 4 7
USA 0.62 5 8
Spain 0.66 6 10
Belgium 0.73 7 4
Australia 0.81 8 9
UK 0.89 9 5
Sweden 0.92 10 6
Kenya 0.99 11 11
Korea 0.99 12 14
Greece 1.25 13 12
Mexico 1.75 14 19
Turkey 1.78 15 17
Indonesia 1.80 16 18
Chile 1.99 17 13
Italy 2.65 18 15
Egypt 5.19 19 20
Israel 5.43 20 16
Source: Katz and Rosenberg (1989)
3.1 Shortcomings of the Katz-Rosenberg Model
Schnytzer (1994), in a note to Katz and Rosenberg, pointed out that while the Katz-Rosenberg 
method may be applied to measure rent-seeking either in one country or a number of countries with 
similar political systems, its use in a general cross-country comparison - as in the original application 
of Katz and Rosenberg - is subject to severe reservations, so severe that the international compar­
isons obtained cannot be taken seriously.
Since the Katz-Rosenberg measure of rent-seeking is based on changes in budgetary allocations, 
its use in ranking different countries in terms of the extent of rent-seeking is based on the assumption 
that the rules governing changes in the budget are constant across political systems and environ­
ments. However, this assumption is evidently false.
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Five countries, Switzerland, FR Germany, Canada, U.S.A., and Australia, with small values of 
lOOlFc, have federal systems of government, whereas the remainder have unitary systems. The com­
position of the government budget in the federal systems differs remarkably from that in the unitary 
systems of other groups. The high value of in Italy may be accounted for partly by the frequency 
of government turnover. Each change in government brings with it changes in allocational priorities 
which are erroneously ascribed to rent-seeking behavior rather than the outcome of voting behavior.
Egypt, in the sample period of 1970-1985, was either at war or on a war footing. This, in targe 
part, explains the high value of lOOkFc. Like Egypt, Israel was on a war footing throughout the 
sample period and was engaged in two wars.^^
Moreover, A'lexico, Indonesia, and Egypt are oil producers. Large fluctuations in oil prices over 
the period will have been reflected in budgetary changes.
In addition to these, another shortcoming of the model is that, in the presence of rent protecting 
behavior, there may be no correlation between the Katz-Rosen berg measure of resources allocated 
to rent-seeking and the value of rents achieved. Consider two countries in which resources are used 
in an attempt to change in the budgetary allocations. In one case, these attempts may succeed, 
whereas in the other case not, owing to successful countervailing activity. Resources will have been 
dissipated in rent-seeking in both countries. However, the Katz-Rosenberg measure will indicate 
rent-seeking behavior in the first country but not in the second.
4 Proposed Model
Our model is similar to that of K atz L· R osenberg (1989), but there exist some slight modifica­
tions. It was shown above that the Katz-Rosenberg method may be applied to measure rent-.seeking 
either only in one country or a number of countries with similar political systems. Thus, after mod­
ifying the model, we will apply it to measure rent-seeking in the Turkish budgetary allocation. Katz 
and Rosenberg talk about a compromise between the rigor of theory and the real world availability 
of data; this compromise is the employment of changes in government spending rather than only 
changes in government transfers are being subject to full dissipation by rent-seeking. This compro­
mise no more exists in our model due to the extensively disaggregated data available for Turkey. 
Thus, our measures can be said to be closer to the real values of social waste.
^^Notc that in th(i sample period of 1970-1985, a military intervention (1971), and a military coup (1980) occured in Turkey. Moreovfrr, 
12 different governments came to i>ower in that period. These factors have an important role on the high value of rent-seeking waste.
38
The data includes the amounts of all expenditure types for all the agencies in the general and 
annexed budget in the period 1990-1994. This period is selected because it contains majority gov­
ernment (1990) as well as coalitions (1991-1994), a general election (1991), and an economic crisis 
(1994). Thus the effects of different political and economic changes on the budgetary allocation and 
rent-seeking are observed.
The very disaggregated raw data is aggregated, and the amounts of all the expenditure types from 
code number 100 to 900 are calculated for all the agencies in the general and annexed budget in the 
sample period 1990-1994. Not all the expenditure types are analyzed in detail. Personnel expendi­
tures and transfer payments which make around 85% of the total expenditures, and construction & 
repairement expenditures which make around 5% of the total expenditures and include investments 
and auctions - which are highly connected with rent and I'ent-seeking activity -, are the core areas 
in the study.
VVe have also, like Katz and Rosenberg, assumed that every change in the expenditure part of 
the government’s budget occurs as a result of rent seeking activity and is indicative of a waste of 
resources resulting from rent-seeking. For the purposes of measurement, this change in the budget is 
considered to represent rent seeking activity. Of course, one may easily note that this is a very strong 
assumption, since not all the changes should necessarily reflect a rent-seeking behavior. Therefore, 
the results may be an overestimate of the true values of the social waste due to rent-seeking. But 
also, although some resources are wasted for rent-seeking purposes, rents may be protected by coun­
tervailing activity so that no change in budgetary allocation is observed. But social waste, - although 
it cannot be observed - which arises both from rent-seeking activity and from the counter activity 
is still there. This leads to an underestimation of the true values of social waste, which will cict to 
counterbalance the above discussed overestimation.
The main difference of our model from that of Katz and Rosenberg is that while they sum the 
absolute changes in the proportions of the budget in years t and i -f 1, we use the difference between 
the programmed and actual amounts of expenditures within a year, which is expected to give a much 
more closer approximation to measure the true social waste due to rent-seeking. The change in two 
consecutive years, as in Katz and Rosenberg, is not adequate for Turkey in the sample period 1990- 
1994 since three different governments came to power in this period. Each change in government 
brings with it changes in the allocation priorities; thus the changes in budgetary expenditures in 
different categories do not efficiently capture a rent-seeking.
VVe calculated for all expenditure types af all agencies the value of
A Actual Amount — Programmed Amount\
Programmed Amount ’
;i9
where AD denotes the absolute deviation in percentage. But this figure is of little consequence when 
the budget figures of a particular agency is small. Therefore, a better measure is introduced by 
adjusting AD with GNP as
AAD = {AD * Programmed Amount 
GNP ),
where AAD denotes the adjusted absolute deviation in percentage, showing the social cost of rent 
seeking. The need for AAD can be better understood with the following example. In year 1994, the 
biggest deviation in transfer expenditures is seen for ’’ Izmir High Technology Institute” for which 
AD is equal to 6,231.42 %, which is a huge deviation. The AD figure for the Undersecretariat of 
Treasury, in the same year and same expenditure type, is 23.42 %, which is negligibly small when 
compared to previous amount. But, of course, these figures solely, are very misleading in a com­
parison. When the AAD values are compared, however, it is observed that this measure is equal 
to 0.000231 of the total GNP for the Izmir High Technology Institute, whereas it is equal to 
1,818107 % of the total GNP for the Undersecretariat of Treasury.
4.1 Results and Interpretation
The tables from Table 1 to Table 25 in the Appendix show the total adjustcxl absolute deviations 
(AAD) in years and in expenditure types; the agencies with the highest AAD values in personnel 
expenditures, consumption L· repairement expenditures, and transfer payments; and the agencies 
with the highest AAD values in total expenditures. Before giving the interpretation of results, the 
following summary tables are provided.
Table 4.3. Total Adjusted Absolute Deviations'’^
Year Total AAD
1990 3.60692
1991 6.74028
1992 3.00499
1993 3.45200
1994 4.49722
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (199C)
number should be read as ” 0.000231 T.L. of every 100 T.L. which is allocated in 1094 for transfer (i.xpenditures in the I/niir High 
Technology Institute is wasted.”
'^'^ See footnote 38 for how to read the numbers in these tables.
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Expenditure Type
Table 4.4. Adjusted Absolute Deviations in Expenditure Types
Adjusted Absolute Deviation 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Personnel Expenditures 1.77420 3.47173 1.49225 1.24081 0.89313
Travel Expenditures 0.02101 0.03583 0.04869 0.03702 0.04530
Purchase of Services 0.04829 0.07394 0.05936 0.06801 0.10974
Purchase of Cons. Materials and Supplies 0.16204 0.36598 0.22377 0.12993 0.17372
Purchase of Furniture and Fixtures 0.00847 0.00918 0.00585 0.00667 0.01175
Purchase of Mach., Equip., and Vehic. 0.11289 0.08732 0.08663 0.05656 0.16626
Construction and Repairernent Exp. 0.36925 0.62854 0.49033 0.31335 0.41427
Other Payments 0.01628 0.00840 0.00913 0.02565 0.01100
Transfer Payments 1.09452 2.05937 0.58899 1.57400 2.67204
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
Table 4.5. The 15 Agencies W ith Highest AAD Values iii Total Expenditures
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Agency AAD Agency AAD Agency AAD Agency AAD Agency A
Min. of Finance 0.71135 Min. of Finance 1.48498 Min. of Nat.Def 0.41603 Min. of Finance 1.29642 Under, of TVea. 1.
Min. of Nat.Edu 0.40450 Min. of Nat.Def 0.64724 Min. of Nat.Edu 0.40571 Min. of Nat.Def 0.28551 Min. of Finance 0.
Under, of Trea. 0.31446 Min. of Health 0.63984 Min. of Finance 0.33609 Min. of Nat.Edu 0.25254 Min. of Nat.Def 0.
Min. of Nat.Def 0.25534 GD of Security 0.57215 M. of Pub.Works 0.22922 M. of Pub. Works 0.23709 GD of Gendarma. 0.
GD of Security 0.23043 Min. of Nat.Edu 0.55919 Min. of Health 0.19453 GD of Security 0.20949 Min. of Health 0.
Min. of Health 0.22609 Under, of Ti*ea. 0.49243 Under.of IVeas. 0.19016 Min. of Health 0.19151 Min. of Nat.Edu. 0.
GD of Vil.Ser. 0.17094 GD of Vil.Ser. 0.40941 GD. of Vil.Ser. 0.18694 Under, of Trea. 0.15595 M. of Pub.Work. 0.
M. of Pub.Wor 0.16858 GD of Highways 0.39020 GC of Gendarma. 0.16348 GC of Gendarma. 0.14884 GD of Stat.Wat. 0.
GD of Sta.Water 0.11680 GD of Sta.Water 0.32636 GD of Security 0.15924 Pres, of Rel.Af 0.10687 GD of Security 0.
Min. of Justice 0.10559 M. of Pub.Works 0.17435 GD of Sta.Water 0.08842 Min. of Justice 0.10456 Prime Ministry 0.
GC of Gendarrna. 0.09996 GC of Gendarma. 0.13133 Pres, of Rel.Af 0.08237 Min. of Agricu. 0.08832 GD of Vil.Ser. 0.(
Min. of Agricu. 0.08475 Min. of Justice 0.11332 GD of Highways 0.07765 Prime Ministry 0.07581 Min. of Agricu. 0.(
GD of Highways 0.07140 Min. of Agricu. 0.09348 Min. of Justice 0.05459 Min. of Indust. 0.06164 Min. of Indust. 0.(
Min. of Int.Aff 0.06616 Pres.of Rel.Aff 0.08977 Min. of Int.Aff 0.03351 Min. of Int.Af. 0.06071 Min. of Justice 0.(
Pre. of Rel.Aff 0.05112 Min. of Int.Aif 0.07426 Prime Ministry 0.03137 Min. of Culture 0.03173 Min. of For.Aif o.<
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
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Table 4.6. The 15 Agencies With Highest AAD  Values in 1990-1994
Personnel Expenditures Construct, and Repair. Expenditures Transfer Payments
Agency AAD Agency AAD Agency AAD
Min. of Nat.Education 1.46561 Min. of Public Works 0.69405 Min. of Finance 3.80421
Min. of Nat.Defense 1.13606 GD.of State Wat.Works 0.24919 Undersecret.of Treas. 2.95064
GD. of Security 1.00578 GD.of Highways 0.19083 Min. of Health 0.13600
Min. of Health 0.85182 Min. of Health 0.16255 Min. of Public Works 0.10664
GD. of Vil. Ser. 0.72722 GC. of Gendarmarie 0.11675 Prime Ministry 0.098.55
GC. of Gendarrnarie 0.49990 Min. of Industry 0.09242 Min. of Nat.Defense 0.08704
Min. of Finance 0.42742 Min. of Finance 0.08777 GD. of Security 0.08360
GD. of Sta.Water Wor 0.32367 Min. of Justice 0.07502 Min. of Nat.Education 0.083.58
Pres, of Rel.Aif. 0.31474 Min. of Nat.Education 0.06642 GD. of Stat.Wat.Works 0.07328
Min. of Justice 0.27983 GD. of Security 0.05400 Min. of Agriculture 0.05773
GD. of Highways 0.25984 Min. of Nat.Defense 0.04438 Min. of Industry 0.05548
Min. of Interior Aff. 0.20815 Min. of Agriculture 0.03928 GI). of Highways 0.04202
Min. of Agriculture 0.20615 GD. of Village Servi. 0.03.595 Min. of Justice 0.03972
Min. of Public Works 0.14749 Min. of Culture 0.03456 Min. of Ener.and NR 0.03771
Prime Ministry 0.08747 Min. of Transportation 0.03436 CD. of Village Servi. 0.037.55
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
Tlie major findings of the analysis can be itemized as follows:
1. The highest total deviation is in 1991 (election year), the second highest value is in 1994 (crisis 
year).
2. The highest total deviation in personnel expenditures, purchase of consumption materials and 
supplies, and construction and repairernent expenses is in 1991 (election year).
3. Transfer payments are the highest in 1994 (crisis year), and 1991 (election year) values are 
also significantly higher than the corresponding values in other years.
4. The total deviation in Ministry of Finance in 1991 is approximately 2 times of 1990’s, 5 times 
of 1992’s, 1.1 times of 1993’s, and 3 times of 1994’s values.
5. The total deviation in General Directorate of Village Services in 1991 is approximately 2.o 
times of 1990’s, 2 times of 1992’s, and 6 times of 1994’s values.
6. The total deviation in General Directorate of Highways in 1991 is approximately 5 times of 
I990’s, 5 times of 1992’s, and 14 times of 1994’s values.
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7. The total deviation in Ministry of National Education in 1991 is approximately 1.4 times of 
1990’s, 1.4 times of 1992’s, 2.2 times of 1993’s, and 3.5 times of 1994’s values.
8. The total deviation in General Directorate of State Water Works in 1991 is approximately 3 
times of 1990’s, 4 times of 1992’s, and 2.5 times of 1994’s values.
9. The total deviation in General Directorate of Security in 1991 is approximately 2.5 times of 
1990’s, 3.5 times of 1992’s, 3 times of 1993’s, and 4.5 times of 1994’s Vcilues.
10. The total deviation in Undersecretariat of Treasury in 1994 (crisis year) is iipproximately 6 
times of 1990’s, 4 times of 1991’s, 10 times of 1992’s, and 12 times of 1993’s values.
11. In 1990-1994, the 3 highest deviations in personnel expenditures are in Ministry of National 
Education, Ministry of National Defense, and General Directorcite of SecuriW.
12. In 1990-1994, the 3 highest deviations in consumption and repairernent expenditures are in 
Ministry of Public works and Settlements, General Directorate of State Water Works, and General 
Directoreate of Highways.
13. In 1990-1994, the 2 extremely highest deviations in transfer expenses are in Ministry of Fi­
nance, and Undersecretariat of Treasury.
14. All of the 10 agencies which deviate the most in personnel expenditures in year 1991, have 
smaller deviation values in the same expenditure type in other years.
15. Except Ministry of Health, Ministry of Industry and Gommerce, and General Directorate of 
State Water Works, all other 7 agencies which deviate the most in transfer payments in year 1994, 
have smaller deviation values in the same expenditure type in other years.
The results above lead to a very important result, in the sense that we have found a big de­
viation in the election year 1991 in especially three largest expenditure t}q)cs, namely, pensonnel 
expenditures, purchases of consumption materials and supplies, and transfer payments. Since we 
had assumed that the deviations in the budgetary allocations represent rent seeking activity, and 
every change in the expenditure part of the government’s budget occurs as a result of rent-seeking 
and is indicative of a waste of resources, we can conclude that in election year 1991 a big corruption 
and rent-seeking activity occured resulting from the populist and partisan behaviors for the election 
campaign, and leading to the waste of the scarce resources of the economy.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the supposition that any change in budgetary allocation is the consequence of rent- 
seeking activities, and modifying the Katz-Rosenberg model, a new measure is introduced for the 
Turkish case to find the social waste due to rent-seeking. The data of budget expenditures in 
1990-1994 are analyzed; the agencies, expenditure types, and years with the highest deviations are 
determined. The major finding is that, in the election year 1991, when compared to other years, a 
remarkably high deviation is observed, in the personnel expenditures, construction repairernent 
expenditures, and transfer payments. Moreover, in the year of ’’ economic crisis” , 1994, the transler 
payments are observed to be extremely high with respect to the corresponding values of other years.
The highest deviations in the personnel expenditures are observed in the Ministry of National 
Education, the Ministry of Ncitional Defense, General Directorate of Security, and the Ministry of 
Health, in agencies of which a large amount of personnel is employed. Also the biggest deviations 
in the construction L· repairement expenditures are observed in the Ministry of Public Works and 
Settlements, and General Directorate of State Water Works, tlic agencies of which have mainly in­
vestment and construction duties.
The social waste of rent-seeking which is indicated by the deviations, can be reduced by decreasing 
the expenditure amounts of the agencies. This automatically leads to the concepts of privatization, 
and reduction in the size of the the state’s activities. Since the rents are created by the government 
activity and the changes in it, the simplest and most effective way to avoid rent-seeking problem is 
to avoid government interventions that lead to rent-seeking and to decrease the size and composition 
of the government activities.
Some proposals for reform have been introduced, which are expected to produce some benefits. 
The best way of a budget improvement seems not to introduce wholly a new system but to incor­
porate some new elements gradually in the conventional framework. Regular communication and 
cooperation between budgeters and planners are necessary to avoid confusion, waste, and ineffi­
ciency. The success of a reform proposal depends also to a great extent on the quality of political 
leadership. Moreover, budget process is very important in reducing the rent-seeking related social 
waste. If the position of the prime minister or finance minister is strong in the government, and if 
there exists a parliamentary power with strong limits on changes, and a large degree of transparency 
of the budget, then rent-seeking behavior will be highly eliminated.
The propo.sed measure of rent-seeking in the government budgetary allocation is, oI course, lar 
from perfect. However, truer results may be attained if the data would be available in a more 
disaggregated form. An extension of this study may be, upon availability ot data, analyzing the 
subclassification of expenditures. The transfers, for example, could then be investigated in a greater
detail as transfers to state economic enterprises, to municipalities, to annexed budget agencies, to 
social security funds, and interest payments. Moreover the departments and subdepartments in the 
agencies might be analyzed rather than the whole agency itself.
45
REFERENCES
1. Atiyas I., and S. Sayin (1996), Siyasi Sorumluluk, Yönetsel Sorumluluk ve Butce Sistemi, 
mimeo.
2. Bayley, D.H. (1966), ’’ The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation”, Western Political 
Quarterly 19, pp. 719-732.
3. Buchanan J.M. (1980), ’’Rent seeking and Profit Seeking” in ’’Toward a Theory of the Rent- 
Seeking Society” , pp. 3-15, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas.
4. Buchanan .J.M., R.D. Tollison, and G. Tullock (1980), ’’ Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking 
Society”, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas.
5. Burkhead, J. (1956), ’’Government Budgeting”, Wiley, pp. 110-132.
6. Buyuldu S., and M. Kamiloglu (1976), ’’Genel Muhasebe Kanunu Aciklarnasi”, Ankara, 1976, 
p. 85.
7. Caiden, N., and A. Wildavsky (1980), ’’Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries”, Transac­
tion, 1980.
8. Cansizlar, D., and T. Erken (1993), ’’Budgeting in Turkey”, Ministry of Finance.
9. Coşkun, G. (1972), ’’Program Budgeting Model in Turkey”, Ankara, 1972, pp. 1-12.
10. Coşkun, G. (1978), ’’Кати Mali Yönetimi”, Ankara, 1978.
11. Downs A. (1957), ”An Economic Theory of Democracy”, Harper, New York.
12. Easton, D. (1959), ’’ The Political System: An inquiry into the State of Political Science”, 
Knopf, 1959, pp. 129-141.
13. Erginay, A. (1975), ’’Кати Mâliyesi”, Ankara, 1975.
14. Ferejolin J., and K. Krehbiel (1987), ’’ The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget”, Amer­
ican Journal of Political Science 31, pp. 296-320.
46
15. Feyzioglu, B.N. (1972), "N azari, Tatbiki, M ukayeseli B u tc e” , Istanbul, 1972.
16. Fieldhouse, D.K. (1986), "B lack A frica  1 9 4 5 -1 9 8 0 ”, Allen and Unwin, London.
17. Hammond T.H., and J.H. Knott (1979), "A  Z ero -B a sed  Look at Z ero -B a sed  B ud getin g”, 
Transaction, 1979.
18. Harlow, R.L. (1973), "O n  the D ecline and Possible Fall o f  P P B S ” , Public Finance Quarterly, 
Vol. 1, pp. 85-105.
19. Hicks, U.K. (1965), "D evelop m en t F ina nce: Planning and C on trol” , Oxford University Press, 
pp. 170-171.
20. IMF (1974), "A  M anual on G overn m en t Finance S ta tistics” , Washington, D.C., pp. 191-193.
21. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 2, "O ffice, M isu se  o f ” , ed. D. L. Sills, 
Macmillan and Free Press, p. 272.
22. Kara, M. (1982), "P rogram  Bütçenin Turk К а т и Yönetim inde U ygulanm asi” , Ankara, 1982, 
p. 32.
23. Katz E., and J. Rosenberg (1989), "R en t-seekin g  fo r  B udgetary A lloca tion : P relim in ary R e­
sults fo r  2 0  C o u n tries” , Public Choice 60, pp. 133-144.
24. Krueger, A.O. (1974), "T h e  Political E co n o m y o f  the R ent-Seeking S o c ie ty ”, American Eco­
nomic Review 64, pp. 291-303.
25. Kurer 0 . (1991), ” Clientelism , C orruption, and the Allocation o f  R eso u rces” , Public Choice 
77, pp. 259-273.
26. Lindblom, C.E. (1958), "P o lic y  A n a lysis” , American Economic Review, Vol.48, pp. 298-312.
27. LelF, N.H. (1964), "E c o n o m ic  D evelop m en t Through Bureaucratic C o rru p tio n ”, American 
Behavioral Scientist 8, pp. 8-14.
28. Medema S.G. (1991), "A n o th er  Look at the Problem  o f  R en t-S eek in g” , Journal of Economic 
Issues, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 1049-1065.
47
29. Mueller D.С. (1989), ’’Public C h o ice” , Cambridge University Press, New York.
30. Myerson R.B. (1984a), ” T w o -P erson  Bargaining P roblem s with Incom plete In fo rm a tio n ”, 
Econometrica 52, pp. 461-487.
31. Myerson R.B. (1984b), ’’ Cooperative G am es with Incom plete In fo rm a tio n ”, International 
.Journal of Game Theory 13, pp. 69-86.
32. Nye, J.S. (1967), ’’ C orru ption  and Political D evelop m en t: A C o st-B en efit A n a ly sis” , Ameri­
can Political Science Review 61, pp. 417-427.
33. Olson, M. (1965), ’’ The Logic o f  Collective A c tio n ”, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
34. Ozer, I. (1986), ’’D evlet M â liye si” , Vol. 2, Ministry of F'inance, 1986/277.
35. Oztek, D., and T. Çağlayan (1988), ’’К ат и Ilarcamalarinin Yönetim  ve D en e tim i”, Ministry 
of Finance, 1986/277.
36. Payne J.L. (1991), ’’ The Culture o f  Spending:, ICS Press, San Francisco.
37. Posner R.A. (1975), ’’ The Social C ost o f  M o n op o ly  and R egulation”, Journal of Political 
Economy 83, pp. 807-827.
38. Report to the Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. S(;nate, ’’P ros mid C ons  
o f  a Separate Capital Budget fo r  the Federal G ov ern m en t” , GAO/PAD-83-1.
39. Samuels W., and N. Mercuro (1984), ”A Critique o f  R ent-Seeking T h eo ry” in ’’ Neoclassical 
Political Economy” , ed. Colander D.C., pp. 55-70, Ballinger, Cambridge.
40. Schnytzer A. (1994), ’’ Changes in B udgetary Allocation and International C om pa rison s o f  
the Social C o st o f  R ent-Seekin g: A Critical N o te ” , Public Choice 79, pp. 357-362.
41. Scott J.C. (1972), ’’ Com parative Political C orru p tion ” , Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
42. Smith, A. (1776), ” A n  Inquii'y into the Nature and C auses o f  the Wealth o f  N a tio n s”, ed. E. 
Cannan, Modern Library, 1937, p. 681.
43. Tullock G. (1967), ’’ The W elfare C ost o f  Tariffs, M on opolies, and T h eft” , Western Ecornomic 
-lournal 5, pp. 224-232.
48
44. Ulugbay, H. (1995), ” Butce Harcamalarinin Eleştirisel A n a lizi” , Turk Harb-Is Sendikası, 
Ankara, 1995.
45. UN (1965), ” A  M anual o f  Program m e and P erform an ce B u d getin g”, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs.
46. von Hagen J. (1992), ’’Budgeting Procedures and Fiscal P erform an ce in the E C ” , Economic 
Papers 96, European Commissions, Brussels.
47. von Hagen J., and I.J. Harden (1995), ’’Budget P rocesses and C om m itm en t to Fiscal D isci­
p lin e”, European Economic Review 39, pp. 771-779.
48. VVaterston, A. (1965), ’’D evelop m en t Planning: L esson s o f  E xp erien ce”, Johns Hopkins Uni­
versity Press, p. 201.
49. Wildavsky, A. (1975), ’’Budgeting: A  Com parative T h eory o f  B udgetary P ro cesses” , Little 
Brown, 1975, pp. 214-219.
49
APPENDIX
50
Table 1. Total Adjusted Absolute Deviations'*“
Year Total A AD
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
3.60692
6.74028
3.00499
3.45200
4.49722
Source; Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
Table 2. Adjusted Absolute Deviations in Expenditure Types
Expenditure Type Adjusted Absolute Deviation 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Personnel Expenditures 1.77420 3.47173 1.49225 1.24081 0.89313
Travel Expenditures 0.02101 0.03583 0.04869 0.03702 0.04530
Purchase of Services 0.04829 0.07394 0.05936 0.06801 0.10974
Purchase of Cons. Materials and Supplies 0.16204 0.36598 0.22377 0.12993 0.17372
Purchase of Furniture and Fixtures 0.00847 0.00918 0.00585 0.00667 0.01175
Purchase of Mach., Equip., and Vehic. 0.11289 0.08732 0.08663 0.05656 0.16626
Construction and Repairement Exp. 0.36925 0.62854 0.49033 0.31335 0.41427
Other Payments 0.01628 0.00840 0.00913 0.02565 0.01100
Transfer Payments 1.09452 2.05937 0.58899 1.57400 2.67204
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
’ Soc footnote 38 for liow to road the iuimbnr.s in those tahlos.
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Table 3. The 15 Agencies With Highest AAD Values in Total Expenditures in 1990
A gen cy
Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of National Education 
Undersecretariat of Treasury 
Ministry of National Defense 
General Directorate of Security 
Ministry of Health
General Directorate of Village Services 
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements 
General Directorate of State Water Works 
Ministry of Justice 
General Command of Gendarmarie 
Ministry of Agriculture 
General Directorate of Highways 
Ministry of Interior Affairs 
Presidency of Religious Affairs
AAD
0.71135
0.40450
0.31446
0.25534
0.23043
0.22609
0.17094
0.16858
0.11680
0.10559
0.09996
0.08475
0.07140
0.06616
0.05112
Source; Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
Table 4. The 15 Agencies W ith Highest A AD  Valuos in Total Expenditures in 1991
Agency
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of National Defense
Ministry of Health
General Directorate of Security
Ministry of National Education
Undersecretariat of Treasury
General Directorate of Village Services
General Directorate of Highways
General Directorate of State Water Works
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements
General Command of Gendarmarie
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Agriculture
Presidency of Religious Affairs
Ministry of Interior Affairs
AAD
1.48498
0.64724
0.63984
0.57255
0.55919
0.49243
0.40941
0.39020
0.32636
0.17435
0.13133
0.11332
0.09348
0.08977
0.07426
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
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Table 5. The 15 Agencies With Highest AAD Values in Total Expenditures in 1992
A gency
Ministry of National Defense 
Ministry of National Education 
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements
Ministry of Health
Undersecretariat of Treasury
General Directorate of Village Services
General Command of Gendarmarie
General Directorate of Security
General Directorate of State Water Works
Presidency of Religious Affairs
General Directorate of Highways
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Interior Affairs
Prime Ministry
AAD
0.41603
0.40571
0.33609
0.22922
0.19453
0.19016
0.18694
0.16348
0.15924
0.08842
0.08237
0.07765
0.05459
0.03351
0.03137
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
Table 6. The 15 Agencies W ith Highest AAD  Values in Total Expenditures in 1993 
Agency AAD
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of National Defense
Ministry of National Education
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements
General Directorate of Security
Ministry of Health
Undersecretariat of Treasury
General Command of Gendarmarie
Presidency of Religious Affairs
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Agriculture
Prime Ministry
Ministry of Industry and Commerce 
Ministry of Interior Affairs 
Ministry of Culture
1.29642
0.28551
0.25254
0.23709
0.20949
0.19151
0.15595
0.14884
0.10687
0.10456
0.08832
0.07581
0.061638
0.060712
0.031734
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
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Table 7, The 15 Agencies With Highest AAD Values in Total Expenditures in 1994
Agency AAD
Undersecretariat of Treasury 1.82683
Ministry of Finance 0.55999
Ministry of National Defense 0.36154
General Command of Gendarmarie 0.20115
Ministry of Health 0.17833
Ministry of National Education 0.15476
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements 0.15468
General Directorate of State Water Works 0.13890
General Directorate of Security 0.12122
Prime Ministry 0.10170
General Directorate of Village Services 0.06552
Ministry of Agriculture 0.05417
Ministry of Industry and Commerce 0.04883
Ministry of Justice 0.04831
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 0.04534
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
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Table 8. The 15 Agencies With Highest A AD Values in Personnel Expenditures in 1990-1994
A gen cy  A A D
Ministry of National Education 
Ministry of National Defense 
General Directorate of Security 
Ministry of Health
General Directorate of Village Services 
General Command of Gendarmarie 
Minstry of Finance
General Directorate of State Water Works
Presidency of Religious Affairs
Ministry of Justice
General Directorate of Highways
Ministry of Interior Affairs
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements
Prime Ministry
1.46561
1.13606
1.00578
0.85182
0.72722
0.49990
0.42742
0.32367
0.31474
0.27983
0.25984
0.20815
0.20615
0.14749
0.08747
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
Table 9. T he 15 Agencies W ith Highest AAD  Values in Con, and Rep. Expenditures in 1990-1994
Agency AAD
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements
General Directorate of State Water Works
General Directorate of Highways
Ministry of Health
General Command of Gendarmarie
Ministry of Industry and Commerce
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of National Education
General Directorate of Security
Ministry of National Defense
Ministry of Agriculture
General Directorate of Village Services
Ministry of Culture
Ministry of Transportation
0.69405
0.24919
0.19083
0.16255
0.11675
0.09242
0.08777
0.07502
0.06642
0.05400
0.04438
0.03928
0.03595
0.03456
0.03436
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
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Agency AAD
Ministry of Finance 3.80421
Undersecretariat of Treasury 2.95064
Ministry of Health 0.13600
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements 0.10664
Prime Ministry 0.09855
Ministry of National Defense 0.08704
General Directorate of Security 0.08360
Ministry of National Education 0.08358
General Directorate of State Water Works 0.07328
Ministry of Agriculture 0.05773
Ministry of Industry and Commerce 0.05548
General Directorate of Highways 0.04202
Ministry of Justice 0.03972
Ministry of Energy and National Resources 0.03771
General Directorate of Village Services 0.03755
Source: Author’s calculation from tlie data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
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Ministry of National Education 
General Directorate of Security 
Ministry of Health
General Directorate of Village Services 
Ministry of National Defense 
Ministry of Finance
General Directorate of State Water Works 
Ministry of Justice 
Ministry of Agriculture 
General Command of Gendarrnarie
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
______ Table 11. The 10 Agencies With Highest AAD Values in Personnel Expenditures in 1990
A gency Programmed Exp. 
(in Billion T.L.)
Actual Exp.
(in Billion T.L.)
AD
(in %)
AAD 
(in %)
7,000 8,318 18.82 0.33178
1,381 2,106 52.48 0.18256
1,750 2,433 39.04 0.17203
977 1,549 58.55 0.14404
2,950 3,465 17.47 0.12979
566 1,006 77.62 0.11072
887 1,183 33.33 0.07453
473 768 62.50 0.07445
56G 845 49.37 0.07037
266 538 101.57 0.06828
Tabic 12. The 10 Agencies W ith Highest A AD  Values in Persoimcl Expenditures in 1991
Agency Programmed Exp. 
(in Billion T.L.)
Actual Exp.
(in Billion T.L.)
AD
(in %)
AAD
(in %)
Ministry of National Education 11,690 14,883 27.31 0.50330
Ministry of National Defense 4,067 6,838 68.14 0.4.3684
General Directorate of Village Services 1,655 4,141 1.50.12 0.39185
Ministry of Health 3,085 4,354 41.11 0.19996
General Directorate of State Water Works 1,569 2,764 76.11 0.188.30
General Directorate of Security 2,641 3,826 44.85 0.18673
General Directorate of Highways 1,043 2,065 97.95 0.16107
Ministry of Finance 900 1,785 98.33 0.13951
Presidency of Religious Affairs 1,075 1,611 49.87 0.08452
Ministry of Justice 981 1,498 52.64 0.08146
Source; Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
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Table 13. The 10 Agencies With Highest AAD Values in Personnel Expenditures in 1992
A gency Programmed Exp. 
(in Billion T.L.)
Actual Exp. AD AAD 
(in Billion T.L.) (in %) (in %)
Ministry of National Education 
Ministry of National Defense 
General Directorate of Village Services 
General Directorate of Security 
Ministry of Health 
General Command of Gendarmarie 
Presidency of Religious Affairs 
Ministry of Finance 
General Directorate of Highways 
Ministry of Justice
25,505 29,311 14.92 0.34485
10,500 13,204 25.76 0.24511
5,170 6,811 31.76 0.14877
5,700 7,104 24.65 0.12730
7,500 8,629 15.07 0.10238
1,G00 2,617 63.58 0.09217
2,250 3,109 38.19 0.07786
2,500 3,213 28.54 0.06465
3,188 3,701 16.10 0.04651
2,300 2,648 15.15 0.03157
Source; Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
Table 14. The 10 Agencies W ith Highest AAD  Values in Personnel Expenditures in 1993
Agency Programmed Exp. 
(in Billion T.L.)
Actual Exp.
(in Billion T.L.)
AD
(in %)
AAD
(in %)
Ministry of National Education 49,015 53,162 8.46 0.20765
General Directorate of Security 9,000 12,719 41.33 0.18625
Ministry of National Defense 20,000 23,508 17.54 0.17567
General Command of Gendarmarie 3,000 5,283 76.10 0.11431
Presidency of Religious Affairs 3,500 5,547 58.49 0.10250
Ministry of Finance 3,537 6,465 54.49 0.09652
Ministry of Justice 3,500 4,869 39.13 0.06856
Ministry of Agriculture 3,800 4,955 30.40 0.057843
Ministry of Health 14,000 15,102 7.88 0.05521
Ministry of Interior Affairs 2,686 3,471 29.20 0.03928
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
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General Command of Gendarrnarie
Ministry of National Defense
General Directorate of Security
Ministry of Nationcil Education
General Directorate of State Water Works
General Directorate of Village Services
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Interior Affairs
Ministry of Justice
A gency Programmed Exp. 
(in Billion T.L.)
Actual Exp.
(in Billion T.L.)
AD
(in %)
AAD 
(in %)
7,000 12,831 83.31 0.15000
35,000 40,799 16.51 0.14865
18,900 22,527 19.19 0.09329
80,377 77,343 3.77 0.07802
12,724 10,462 17.77 0.05816
16,616 14,961 9.96 0.04256
24,050 25,442 5.79 0.03583
2,755 4,076 47.96 0.03399
5,200 6,241 20.03 0.02679
7,150 8,075 12.94 0.02380
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
59
Table 16. The 10 Agencies With Highest AAD Values in Construction and Repairement
____________________________________ Expenditures in 1990
Agency Programmed Exp. 
(in Billion T.L.)
Actual Exp. AD AAD
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements 93 589 531.47 0.12483
Ministry of Finance 117 9 91.92 0.02708
Ministry of Industry and Commerce 184 82 55.03 0.02551
Ministry of Justice 93 0.4 99.47 0.02341
Ministry of Health 224 134 40.08 0.02264
General Directorate of Security 117 51 56.58 0.01677
General Directorate of Highways 714 780 9.23 0.01661
Ministry of National Education C19 561 9.38 0.01462
General Command of Gendarmarie 51 0 100.00 0.01307
General Directorate of Village Services 554 509 8.13 0.01134
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
Table 17. The 10 Agencies W ith Highest AAD  Values in Construction and Repairenient
Expenditures in 1991
Agency Programmed Exp. Actual Exp. AD AAD
(in Billion T.L.) (in Billion T.L.) (in %) (in %)
General Directorate of State Water Works 1,813 2,574 41.98 0.11997
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements 157 869 451.60 0.11222
Ministry of Health 291 126 56.84 0.02616
General Command of Gendarmarie 146 0.07 99.95 0.02309
Ministry of Finance 152 23 84.59 0.02032
Ministry of Justice 96 0.3 99.65 0.01512
Ministry of National Education 946 874 7.56 0.01127
Ministry of Industry and Commerce 172 235 36.69 0.00998
General Directorate of Security 202 140 30.83 0.00984
General Directorate of Highways 976 1,201 4.57 0.00703
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
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Table 18. The 10 Agencies With Highest AAD Values in Construction and Repairenient
____________________________________ Expenditures in 1992
A gency Programmed Exp. Actual Exp. AD AAD
(in Billion T.L.) (in Billion T.L.) (in %) (in %)
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements 120 
General Directorate of State Water Works 3,224 
General Command of Gendarmarie 432
Ministry of Health 523
General Directorate of Highways 1,577
Ministry of Finance 197
General Directorate of Village Services 1,040
Ministry of Justice 149
Ministry of National Education 2,143
Ministry of Transportation 454
2,331 
3,993 
4
236
1,787
10
1,214
0.3
2,028
349
1,832.02
23.84
98.88
54.86
13.27
94.80
16.73
99.79
5.38
23.10
0.20029
0.06966
0.03876
0.02604
0.01898
0.01693
0.01577
0.01354
0.01044
0.00951
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
Tabic 19. The 10 Agencies W ith Highest AAD  Values in Construction and Repaireinent 
______________________________________ Expenditures in 1993______________________________________
Agency Programmed Exp. Actual Exp. AD AAD
(in Billion T.L.) (in Billion T.L.) (in %) (in %)
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements 229
Ministry of Health 965
General Command of Gendarmarie 557
Ministry of Industry and Commerce 508
Ministry of Agriculture 317
Ministry of Finance 283
Ministry of Justice 244
Court of Accounts 102
Ministry of Culture 382
Prime Ministry 55
3,400
362
4
1
42
24
0.1
0.7
321
0.5
1,379.13
62.48
99.15
99.71
86.47
91.42
99.95
99.30
15.92
98.98
0.15874
0.03020
0.02768
0.02537
0.01373
0.01298
0.01224
0.00508
0.00305
0.00277
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
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Table 20. The 10 Agencies With Highest AAD Values in Construction and Repairement
____________________________ Expenditures in 1994 ______________________
Agency Programmed Exp. Actual Exp. AD AAD
(in Billion T.L.) (in Billion T.L.) (in %) (in %)
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements 196 4,006 1,934.01 0.09799
General Directorate of State Water Works 12,497 10,278 17.76 0.05709
Ministry of Health 1,980 516 73.92 0.03765
Ministry of National Defense 1,667 2,865 71.89 0.03083
Ministry of National Education 5,809 4,689 19.27 0.02879
Ministry of Industry and Commerce 1,087 43 96.03 0.02686
Genercil Command of Gendarmarie 940 390 58.48 0.01415
Ministr}  ^ of Justice 416 0.2 99.95 0.01070
Ministry of Finance 412 6 98.49 0.01046
Ministry of Culture 801 410 48.77 0.01006
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
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Agency
Ministry of Finance 
Undersecretariat of Treasury 
General Directorate of State Water Works 
Ministry of National Education 
Ministry of Culture
General Directorate of Youth and Sport 
Ministry of National Defense 
General Directorate of Highways 
General Directorate of Security 
Ministry of Health
best AAD Values in Transfer Payments in 1990
Programmed Exp. Actual Exp. AD AAD
(in Billion T.L.) (in Billion T.L.) (in %) (in %)
18,332 16,117 12.08 0.55763
15,385 16,623 8.05 0.31176
126 262 108.08 0.03433
285 399 39.93 0.02868
156 230 47.20 0.01858
60 127 112.28 0.01704
183 247 35.05 0.01617
55 103 85.10 0.01196
46 86 87.00 0.01017
66 99 50.42 0.00840
Source; Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
Table 22. The 10 Agencies With Highest AAD  Values in Ti'ansfei· Payments in 1991
Agency Programmed Exp. Actual Exp. AD AAD
(in Billion T.L.) (in Billion T.L.) (in %) (in %)
Ministry of Finance 38,871 30,570 21.35 1.30847
Undersecretariat of Treasury 35,060 38,147 8.80 0.48660
Ministry of Energy and National Resources 369 544 47.45 0.02763
Ministry of Agriculture 482 331 31.37 0.02388
Ministry of National Education 586 698 19.18 0.01771
Ministry of National Defense 268 371 38.32 0.01622
General Directorate of State Water Works 360 449 24.74 0.01404
General Directorate of Highways 112 174 54.84 0.00971
General Directorate of Security 323 361 11.69 0.00596
Ministry of Health 148 167 12.39 0.00290
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
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Table 23. The 10 Agencies With Highest AAD Values in Transfer Payments in 1992
A gency Programmed Exp. Actual Exp. AD AAD 
(in Billion T.L.) (in Billion T.L.) (in %) (in %)
Ministry of Finance
Undersecretariat of Treasury
Ministry of Health
Ministry of National Education
Ministry of National Defense
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2General Directorate of State Water Works
General Directorate of Highways
General Directorate of Village Services
General Directorate of Security
50,703 53,341 5.20 0.23905
54,437 52,380 3.78 0.18640
662 277 58.07 0.03486
1,560 1,350 13.45 0.01901
531 701 31.98 0.01541
224 360 60.22 0.01226
705 830 17.68 0.01131
175 280 59.96 0.00952
74 178 140.03 0.00942
241 326 35.14 0.00769
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
Table 24. The 10 Agencies With Highest AAD  Values in Ti*aiisfer Paynieiits in 1993
Agency Programmed Exp. 
(in Billion T.L.)
Actual Exp.
(in Billion T.L.)
AD
(in %)
AAD 
(in %)
Ministry of Finance 125,478 102,030 18.69 1.17399
Undersecretariat of Treasury 164,842 161,890 1.79 0.14778
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements 2,607 3,539 35.75 0.04667
Ministry of Health 1,261 443 64.84 0.04094
Ministry of Industry and Commerce 195 873 346.29 0.03394
Ministry of Environment 304 730 140.00 0.02134
Prime Ministry 7,917 8,277 4.55 0.01805
Ministry of National Education 2,982 2,693 9.68 0.01445
Ministry of Justice 333 618 85.44 0.01427
Ministry of National Defense 857 1,138 32.79 0.01408
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
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Agency
Ministry of Finance 
Undersecretariat of Treasury 
Prime Ministry
Ministry of Public Works and Settlements
Ministry of Health
Ministry of National Defense
Ministry of Industry and Commerce
Ministry of Agriculture
General Directorate of State Water Works
General Directorate of Village Services
lest AAD  Values in Ti'ansfer Payments in 1994
Programmed Exp. Actual Exp. AD AAD
(in Billion T.L.) (in Billion T.L.) (in %) (in %)
301,856 372,542 23.42 1.81811
174,033 153,618 11.73 0.52508
13,382 16,149 20.67 0.07115
5,083 3,228 36.48 0.04769
1,433 330 76.96 0.02838
607 1,585 161.16 0.02517
259 1,076 315.26 0.02103
196 966 392.16 0.01981
1,369 1,898 38.63 0.01360
152 631 314.87 0.01233
Source: Author’s calculation from the data of Ministry of Finance (1996)
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Table 26. General Budget Agencies - 1995
Code Number Name
1
2
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 
11 
12 
13 
15 
!6
17
18
19
20 
21 
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 
29 
31 
34 
36
39
40
42
43
44 
46
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC 
COURT OF ACCOUNTS 
COUNCIL OF STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
PRIME MINISTRY 
STATE PLANNING ORGANIZATION 
STATE INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF TITTLE DEEDS AND CADASTER
PRESIDENCY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AFFAIRS
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY
GENERAL COMMAND OF GENDARMARIE
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF METEOROLOGICAL AFFAIRS
COASTAL GUARD FORCES
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION
MINISTRY OF TOURISM
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE
MINISTRY OF CULTURE
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND SETTLEMENTS 
MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
MINISTRY OF LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION 
SUPREME COURT
UNDERSECRETARIAT OF TREASURY AND FOREIGN TRADE
MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT
UNDERSECRETARIAT OF SEA
UNDERSECRETARIAT OF CUSTOMS
MINISTRY OF FORESTRY
UNDERSECRETARIAT OF WOMAN AND SOCIAL SERVICES
Source: Ministry of Finance (1996)
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Table 27. Annexed Budget Agencies - 1995
Code Number Name
53
55
56
57
58
59
60 
61 
63
65
66 
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80 
81 
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF FORESTRY
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF PETROLEUM AFFAIRS
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF HIGHWAYS
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF STATE WATER WORKS
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF HEALTH OF FRONTIERS AND SHORES
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF FOUNDATIONS
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF YOUTH AND SPORT
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF AGRICULTURAL REFORM
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF VILLAGE SERVICES
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF SOCIAL SERVICES AND CHILD PROTECTION
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF WIRELESS MEDIA
GALATASARAY EDUCATION FOUNDATION
IZMIR HIGH TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE
GEBZE HIGH TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE
HIGHER EDUCATION COUNCIL
GAZİANTEP UNIVERSITY
YUZUNCU YIL UNIVERSITY
GAZI UNIVERSITY
ANKARA UNIVERSITY
ISTANBUL UNIVERSITY
ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
EGE UNIVERSITY
HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
ÇUKUROVA UNIVERSITY
DİCLE UNIVERSITY
INONU UNIVERSITY
FIRAT UNIVERSITY
ONDOKUZ MAYIS UNIVERSITY
ULUDAĞ UNIVERSITY
SELÇUK UNIVERSITY
ANADOLU UNIVERSITY
c u m h u r iy e t  u n iv e r s it y
ATATÜRK UNIVERSITY
KARADENİZ TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY
ERCIYES UNIVERSITY
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
AKDENİZ UNIVERSITY
MARMARA UNIVERSITY
YILDIZ TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
m i m a r  SINAN UNIVERSITY
DOKUZ EYLÜL UNIVERSITY
TRAKYA UNIVERSITY
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(Continued) Table 27. Annexed Budget Agencies - 1995
C ode N um ber Name
101 HARRAN UNIVERSITY
102 SULEYMAN DEMIREL UNIVERSITY
103 ADNAN MENDERES UNIVERSITY
104 ZONGULDAK KARA ELMAS UNIVERSITY
105 m e r s in  UNIVERSITY
106 PAMUKKALE UNIVERSITY
107 BALIKESİR UNIVERSITY
108 KOCAELİ UNIVERSITY
109 SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
110 CELAL BAYAR UNIVERSITY
111 A BANT iz z e t  b a y s a l  UNIVERSITY
112 MUSTAFA KEMAL UNIVERSITY
113 AFYON KOCATEPE UNIVERSITY
114 KAFKAS UNIVERSITY
115 ÇANAKKALE 18 MART UNIVERSITY
116 NIGDE UNIVERSITY
117 DUMLUPINAR UNIVERSITY
118 GAZİOSMANPAŞA UNIVERSITY
119 MUG LA UNIVERSITY
120 KAHRAMANMARAŞ SUTCU IMAM UNIVERSITY
121 KIRIKKALE UNIVERSITY
122 OSMANGAZI UNIVERSITY
Source: Ministry of Finance (1996)
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